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Energy supply is crucial for sustaining economic develop-
ment in the Western Balkans, the poorest region in Europe, 
with a great number of relatively small-sized economies. 
during the conflicts over the break-up of the former So-
cialist Federal republic of Yugoslavia in the 1990s, much of 
the energy infrastructure was damaged or neglected. the 
reconstruction process has been long and difficult; elec-
tricity systems of many of the countries in the area remain 
feeble. according to the World Bank and European Com-
mission reports, the region’s energy shortage is set to grow 
dramatically in the medium term, making calls for a more 
cooperative and unified regional energy market increas-
ingly compelling. therefore, appropriate national and re-
gional energy policies and strategies are indispensable for 
the macro-economic revival of the region and for enhanc-
ing economic growth through improved energy efficiency, 
lower environmental impacts of energy use, and reduced 
energy poverty. 
the European union devoted great effort to the develop-
ment of a comprehensive common energy policy with 
stronger diversification of forms of energy, countries of 
origin and transit routes. the Energy policy for Europe in-
cludes the development of strategic partnerships with the 
countries of transit, production and consumption. the Euro-
pean Commission—as early as 2002—identified Southeast 
Europe as a major transit region for gas, oil, and electricity.
that is the overall context in the Energy Community trea-
ty between the countries of Southeast Europe and the Eu 
which entered into force in July 2006. its aim is to establish 
a stable regulatory and market framework, capable of at-
tracting investment into energy generation, transmission 
and networks. a single regulatory area, aligned with the Eu 
legislation, is expected to remedy market fragmentation, 
ensure security of supply, and contribute to improving the 
state of the environment. this means that key parts of the 
energy acquis are now fully applicable in the Western Bal-
kans. all institutions envisaged by the treaty have already 
been set up and are operating. 
Energy security in the region serves both as a major chal-
lenge and key building block for bringing the region into an 
integrated European system. Critical to the larger regional 
energy equation is the role of Serbia—as one of the larg-
est nations, along with its largest number of consumers 
and polluters in the region—and Kosovo, with the largest 
untapped lignite reserves. despite the political challenges 
between them, both see their future as part of a Southeast 
Europe region-wide energy grid that will provide reliable, 
cost-effective, and cleaner energy for economic develop-
ment and eventual European integration. 
With this in mind, the think tanks, European Movement in 
Serbia (EMinS) and KiprEd in Kosovo, in cooperation with 
Freedom House Europe in Budapest, have focused on the 
reform process in the energy sector to encourage European 
integration and harmonization with European standards. 
Continuing an already successful cooperation in studying 
the movement of goods and people between Kosovo and 
Serbia, the region, and the Eu, the European Standards Se-
ries on energy consists of three short and targeted briefs 
(legal, policy and environmental aspects) directed at policy 
makers in Belgrade and pristina, as well as in the Eu. it is 
hoped that through research and advocacy efforts, the 
complex set of actions needed to push forward energy re-
form will be discussed and debated both in policy forums 
and informal circles in the region, as well as in the halls of 
Brussels.
the key findings of this research can be summarized as four-
main objectives that need to be met: 
introduce a more modern concept of ‘public good’  »
throughout the legal systems in Serbia and Kosovo 
and infuse this concept into the development, inter-
pretation, and implementation of legislation—par-
ticularly in regard to increased public access to deci-
sion making; 
 Ensure that energy reform is carried out in coordina- »
tion with relevant domestic actors; 
develop further mechanisms for including represen- »
tatives of civil society, including groups of energy ex-
perts and those concerned with governance issues; 
create a regional network of professional energy 
associations to enhance dissemination of ‘best prac-
tices’ and professional conduct; and 
Establish regional forums for strategizing on regional  »
energy security. 
Whatever will be the immediate political developments in 
the region, Serbia and Kosovo have to consolidate their posi-
tions in the regional and European energy infrastructure de-
velopment plans and to improve their negotiating position 
in competing for support from the EC, as well as individual 
European countries, russia, the u.S., and international finan-
cial institutions. they need to improve their administrative 
capacities related to development of the energy sector and 
harmonization with the Eu acquis communautaire. accord-
ing to the three issues of the European Standard Series, it is 
clear that they both share similar problems and need similar 
solutions. therefore, the conclusions and recommendations 
offered are relevant although the political constellation 
has changed with unilateral declaration of independence 
in Kosovo on February 17, 2008. Belgrade and pristina will 
need to cooperate to solve energy security problems in the 
best interests of their economies and their citizens.
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7Executive summary
invigorating energy reform in Kosovo and Serbia has the 
ability to partially override the current political impasses 
of the region. the roadmap towards energy security has 
been laid out in a series of international treaties and Eu-
ropean union (Eu) standards obligations. now invigorat-
ed domestic efforts are needed to make energy reform a 
priority, including the necessary effort to coordinate leg-
islation and implement it in a manner fitting European 
standards.
Kosovo and Serbia are part of the larger South East Euro-
pean region that is shaping a new energy grid through 
a series of complex legislation and regional agreements. 
on paper, Kosovo and Serbia have agreed to the Energy 
Community treaty, but both still need to sign on to the 
four necessary international agreements, which are com-
plementary to the Energy Community treaty of 2005. 
Compliance with this and accompanying international 
agreements and Eu acquis communautaire standards is 
progressing, but slowly. 
inevitably, the implementation of international commit-
ments has created legal confusion as domestic legislation 
has been a piecemeal process with gaps and contradic-
tions, including the actual oversight responsibility of the 
energy policy process. Complementary legislation, such 
as a “freedom of information” act, or the understanding 
of “public goods” often fail to be considered as relevant 
to energy-reform decisions, and as a consequence, the 
transparency of decision making and the ability to in-
form the policy process in both Serbia and Kosovo have 
been extremely low.
as a result, Kosovo still has not been able to provide reli-
able energy to its population, even as it sits on the rich-
est lignite reserves in the region and in close proximity 
to feasible natural gas infrastructure. and Serbia is one 
of the biggest polluters of the region, with very little in-
dustrial output to show for its emissions. Both the new 
player, Kosovo, and the inheritor of Yugoslav institutions, 
Serbia, must now act to improve their domestic legal 
environments in order to provide the platform for real 
energy reform and a chance for the region to achieve 
the energy security and economic development that it 
envisions.
Key recommendations include:
ratify the complementary international agree- »
ments of the Energy Community treaty. 
develop Law on implementation of the Energy  »
Community treaty to improve coordination on 
overall domestic-level energy reform.
invigorate use of complementary legislation, such  »
as a “freedom of information” act, that will improve 
good governance.
Modernize legal concept of “public goods” to en- »
sure that energy reform decisions take into ac-
count all costs, benefits, and stakeholders.
methodology and Background
the political dramas of the West Balkans often over-
shadow the fact that individual economic destinies are 
at least partly interdependent. Building an environment 
for economic prosperity demands certain infrastructure 
standards, with a reliable and cost-effective energy sup-
ply as its core. accordingly, energy security in the region 
serves both as a key challenge and building block for 
bringing the region into an integrated European system. 
at one extreme of the energy challenge is Kosovo, at the 
other is Serbia. Kosovo as a responsible energy player 
is starting from scratch; Serbia is both blessed and bur-
dened with the legacy of federal Yugoslav institutions 
as it undertakes energy reforms. understanding ways 
to overcome the challenges facing these two extremes 
will assist the rest of the region as it struggles to develop, 
comply, and cooperate on energy issues.
politically, energy is a hot topic in Kosovo, as it is under-
stood as the basis for any further economic develop-
ment. Yet the focus on developing the lignite reserves 
has created a policy debate featuring more noise than 
substance. in Serbia, energy policy is not perceived as a 
problem even as the country has become one of the larg-
est sources of sulfur dioxide in Europe and struggles to 
supply and reform its energy industry according to inter-
national standards.  
 
Energy policy in the region is usually relegated to a small 
group of experts and to dense reports full of technical 
details. Most of these are lost on the average citizen/con-
sumer, who wants reliable, cost-effective, and hopefully 
clean sources of energy for home and work. 
Serbia, one of the largest nations, consum-
ers, and polluters in the Western Balkans, 
and Kosovo, with the largest untapped 
energy reserves in lignite, play a critical 
role in improving the energy security of 
the region.
8For this first brief reviewing the legal and policy environ-
ment, EMinS and KiprEd completed a legal review of the 
current legislation and its implementation. to supple-
ment this, each carried out a series of semi-structured 
interviews with experts, policy makers, and officials in 
the energy field. the two institutes worked together with 
Freedom House Europe to combine their research find-
ings during a series of workshops.
Where we are and why this is important
the Western Balkan region suffers from energy shortfalls 
that will only increase in the years ahead1. attempts to 
strategize more effective ways to produce, transport, 
and use energy are matched against European standards 
guidelines. But the region still has much to do in order to 
claim some level of energy security.  
Critical to the larger regional energy equation is the role 
of Serbia—as one of the largest nations, consumers, and 
polluters in the region—and Kosovo, with the largest un-
tapped energy reserves in lignite. despite the political 
challenges between them, both see their future as part 
of a South East region-wide energy grid that will provide 
reliable, cost-effective, and cleaner energy as the basis 
for economic development and eventual European inte-
gration.  
Each government has committed to reevaluating its en-
ergy supply systems and improving its delivery and gov-
ernance systems in relation to energy. Since signing the 
2005 Energy Community treaty in athens, pristina and 
Belgrade have had clear obligations to reach compli-
ance in relation to the agreement components and Eu 
standards. However, other policy priorities have meant 
that the political will to effectively strategize and coor-
dinate the necessary complex legislation, expert groups, 
and government institutions has been missing on both 
sides. 
two years after athens, when economic development 
considerations now have the ability to nudge forward 
political considerations, the time has come to closely 
look at ways to encourage the governments to strongly 
focus on energy issues. the following brief provides an 
overview of where each has progressed in terms of legal, 
institutional, and policy considerations. recommenda-
tions on how to encourage more progress form the final 
section of the policy brief.
Where we are now: Legal overview
What has been promised
as the basis for energy cooperation and standards, Koso-
vo2 and Serbia are already signatories of the Energy Com-
munity treaty between the Eu 25 and 9 countries and 
entities of South East Europe (Croatia, Bosnia and Her-
zegovina, Serbia, Montenegro, albania, Macedonia, ro-
mania, Bulgaria, and unMiK Kosovo3). the Energy Com-
munity treaty was signed in athens on october 25, 2005, 
concluding the athens process initiated in 2002 by the 
Eu to establish a regional electricity market in South East 
Europe. improving the balance between energy supply 
and demand was seen as crucial to improving and sus-
taining economic development in the region. 
the Energy Community treaty obliges Kosovo and Ser-
bia to take on a number of principles that will create a 
stable regulatory and market-based framework4. these 
principles also suggest that Kosovo and Serbia sign, rat-
ify, and apply several additional pieces of legislation, in-
cluding the Energy Charter treaty (provides a framework 
for investment into energy infrastructure and use of tran-
sit infrastructure), the Extractive industries transparency 
initiative (assists investment in existing or new extraction 
operations), the aarhus Convention5 (to ensure a trans-
parent and consultative process), and the Kyoto proto-
col (to reduce environmental damage)6. Except for Kyoto 
protocol, neither Serbia nor Kosovo has signed or ratified 
these complementary international obligations.
ratification of the treaty further implies that both will 
comply with a number of European union-level stan-
dards. these include the acquis communautaire “on 
energy” focused on common rules for internal markets 
on electricity7, natural gas, and conditions for access 
Conventions Serbia and Kosovo need to 
sign:
 Energy Charter Treaty•	
 Kyoto Protocol*•	
 Aarhus Convention•	
 Extractive Industries Transparency •	
Initiative
*the Kyoto Protocol to UNFCCC was ratified in 
the Parliament of Serbia on 24th September 2007 
9to cross-border exchanges of electricity and the acquis 
communautaire “on environment,” which suggests that 
construction and operation of new generating plants 
shall be in accordance with Eu standards8. For example, 
acceptable competition parameters are outlined9. and 
customs or quantitative restrictions on the import and 
export of network Energy are prohibited in cross-border 
transmission and/or transportation10. 
Each is also obliged to adopt a “security of supply” state-
ment describing in particular the diversity of supply, 
technological security, and geographic origin of import-
ed fuels. this should be available to all members of the 
treaty. 
and finally, before signing the Energy Community treaty, 
the Eu established the thessaloniki agenda 2003 that 
identifies ways and means of intensifying the Stabiliza-
tion and association process with Western Balkan coun-
tries11. there are eight additional requirements envisaged 
and related to the energy industry in the region that task 
governments to carry out energy policy. While these are 
not regulations as such, they do embody more general 
commitments by the governments to carry out extensive 
policy reform12.
What has been done – snapshot of key do-
mestic legislation
the set of international obligations agreed to in 2005 is 
ambitious. understandably, the process of creating and 
implementing energy reform legislation has been slow 
partially due to the number of related laws that either 
needed to be modified or created. For Serbia, this means 
that a host of energy legislation is being passed to re-
form the sector, and in Kosovo, compliance has required 
the creation of institutions and energy legislation from 
scratch. However, in both cases most of the domestic 
energy legislation related to international obligations is 
very new or not yet in place. and perhaps more critical 
for long-term reform, secondary legislation that would 
allow the new legislation to function as intended is ei-
ther not yet developed, untested and weak, or in some 
cases in conflict with the primary legislation.
in Serbia, the most important legislation in the energy 
sector is the (new) Constitution of the republic of Serbia, 
Energy Law adopted in 2004, national Energy Strategy 
from 2005 and its Strategy implementation document 
from 2007, a set of environmental laws, Law on assets 
owned by the republic of Serbia, Spatial plan from 1996, 
import and prices regulations, as well as the ratification 
of international treaties. these pieces of legislation have 
partially addressed international obligations in the ar-
eas of environment and competition. For example, the 
majority of Serbian laws on environmental protection 
(adopted in december 2004) contain provisions on inte-
grated pollution prevention, corporate responsibility, in-
formation availability, and access to the judiciary. Serbia 
developed plans to apply a number of these directives 
and regulations beginning in July 200713. and the Com-
petition protection act adopted in September 2005 and 
Competition protection Commission established from 
april 2006 are first steps in setting a framework to pro-
tect competition and prevent monopolistic behavior. as 
of yet, there have been no Commission rulings related to 
the energy sector14.
the creation of the Energy regulatory office (Ero) in 
June 2004 provided Kosovo with a coordinating and 
oversight body independent from government agencies 
involved in energy issues15. in general, Ero is responsible 
for the establishment and enforcement of a regulatory 
framework for the energy sector in Kosovo, which will 
serve to achieve compliance with obligations under the 
treaty establishing the Energy Community and harmoni-
zation to the acquis communautaire on energy.
in 2004, domestic legislation to address energy regula-
tion was put forward in three main laws16. these were de-
signed to promote the integration of Kosovo into the Eu-
ropean Economic area (with a view to its future accession 
to the Eu), allow participation in all relevant international 
agreements that Kosovo is a party to or may become as-
sociated, and gradually harmonize Kosovo energy legis-
lation to that of the Eu. 
Kosovo has also partially addressed acquis obligations17; 
however, the process has been somewhat slower given 
the additional administrative processes that need to 
be developed and adhered to in relation to joint gov-
ernance of the unMiK and the provisional institutions 
of Self-Government (piSG). progress has been made on 
some aspects of environmental standards. For example, 
Kosovo has designed and put in power the administra-
tive instruction on the usage of biofuels produced from 
biomass. the government has also decided on stimula-
tion measures for electrical production from renewable 
sources in Kosovo for the period of 2007-2013. 
otherwise, most legislation related to the treaty obliga-
tions is still being created or remains under review. For 
the latter, the major obstacle is the legislation’s budget-
ary impact. this includes, importantly, all directives stem-
ming from EC directive 2003/54, which was used as the 
basis for the creation of the basic laws of 2004. 
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Since the treaties in themselves do not focus on the do-
mestic legislative process, it is not surprising that a num-
ber of domestic laws do not correlate perfectly with the 
treaty provisions. For example, in Kosovo the EC directive, 
along with the directives on best practices, have served 
as the basis for the creation of the existing laws, adden-
dums, and subsequent administrative instructions. these 
incompatibilities are being modified to fit with existing 
laws; however, upon reaching the functional commission 
of the assembly of Kosovo on Energy, industry, and Econ-
omy, they were returned for further approximation with 
Eu directives and best practices. the addendums have 
primarily targeted the possibility of foreign investments 
and the division of power within energy institutions. Ser-
bia is undergoing a similar process of modifying legisla-
tion; for example, the regulation on special conditions on 
importing and refining of oil and oil products from 2001 
has “evolved” several times since its creation. 
Building an energy reform environment
Beyond the need to pass primary legislation, each gov-
ernment has also needed to put in place complementary 
legislation that will allow the proper functioning of the 
energy reform legislation. this includes a diverse set of 
reforms, from investment procedures to energy price 
setting. and all of these are dependent on legislation 
that sets governance requirements on the energy reform 
processes. For example, having in place a public procure-
ment framework or a functioning law on access to infor-
mation is necessary to ensure the required transparency 
and public review. Both Serbia and Kosovo have these 
critical laws on the books, but in practice their applica-
tion in many areas, including energy reform, has dem-
onstrated that such laws remain weak and are not com-
monly enforced.  
to illustrate, Serbia adopted a Law on public access to 
information in 2004; however, prevailing laws related to 
privatization, mining, and energy do not contain provi-
sions to ensure transparency of extractive industries 
investments or undertakings. the Law on Concessions 
contains provisions on the transparency of the process, 
public tendering, and selection of the concessionaire. 
However, the final result of the procedure - an eventual 
concession contract itself - is not necessarily available in 
the public domain. 
and similarly in Kosovo, the Law on access to official 
documents was passed in 2003. Yet Kosovo still lacks a 
basic law on concessions, even as there is a law on the 
procedure for awarding concessions. the existing law 
creates a legal vacuum since it does not foresee which 
authority is responsible for giving the concession, the 
type of goods available for concession, and the national 
interest of institutions.
as well, publicly available data on the energy sector is 
seen more as a “state secret” than as part of the public 
domain. in Serbia in the past years, almost all compe-
tent authorities have had access to external financing 
(donors, public companies, etc.) and have had a chance 
to promote their various plans. Yet annual statements of 
public budgets, capital statements, and asset inventories 
of the government have not been published for a num-
ber of years, and the overall performance of “state assets” 
related to energy is not known. despite the international 
obligation to create an energy security plan drawing on 
domestically generated energy, this is not readily avail-
able. there is no analysis or any suitable measurement of 
performance generated domestically, forcing interested 
parties to depend on international Energy agency (iEa) 
estimates18. the Serbian Statistical office is now complet-
ing subsector statistics on national energy balances in 
order to produce national balances in forthcoming years, 
but the lack of real data has stymied any meaningful ef-
forts at public oversight and consultation. 
a similar lack of publicly available information in Kosovo 
is perhaps best illustrated with the Kosovo C develop-
ment question. the lignite resources of Kosovo19 and, 
more specifically, the building of a new power plant able 
to generate 2,100 MW, dubbed “Kosovo C,” have touched 
off a strong debate within Kosovo over the best manner 
to exploit this key resource and, in the process, provide a 
basis for securing Kosovo’s own energy needs, as well as 
becoming an energy exporter. 
the Lignite power technical assistance project, devel-
oped in partnership with the World Bank, outlined the 
overall planning process for this development, including 
the tools necessary for considering sustainable devel-
opment. While a number of assessments have pointed 
out the potential conflicts that Kosovo C may provoke, 
there have been no multi-sector analyses of the project’s 
potential impacts made available to the public without 
special request.
overall, the decision-making process around Kosovo C to 
Data on the energy sector, which should 
be available to the public, is in reality seen 
as a “state secret” and has remained un-
published for a number of years
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date has lacked transparency. in the hype of exploring 
the best way to use a valuable resource, the institutional 
balance of power and oversight has been overridden by 
the supposed need for quick decisions, by unclear com-
petencies, and an uncoordinated general strategy of the 
entire government20. For example, the Ministry of Energy 
and Mines (MEM) has assumed all responsibilities for the 
construction of the Kosovo C plant: it has decided the ca-
pacity and investment scenario, and it heads the project 
Steering Committee21. no public meetings held to date 
to discuss the Kosovo C issues have adhered to the aar-
hus Convention. the information that MEM has provided 
to citizens through the print media and in public dis-
cussions only covers certain commercial aspects of the 
Kosovo C project. and contrary to the aarhus Conven-
tion, no mention is made of: the current quality of the en-
vironment and projected quality following construction 
of the new power plants; the impact on the health of the 
population or the social conflicts the project will trigger; 
and ways in which these conflicts might be resolved.
in Serbia, taking into account the distribution of compe-
tencies, no one institution is responsible for the imple-
mentation of the national energy policy. the Ministry 
of Mining and Energy, which is responsible for creating 
policy, does not have competencies in price formation, 
while the Ministry of Finance, with no policy responsi-
bilities, determines both prices and salaries in the sector. 
the Law on Communal Services allows cities and munici-
palities to subsidize district heating services, a practice 
that is not only controversial in terms of the treaty (as 
it favors certain energy sources against others) but also 
from the perspective of article 21 of the Constitution23. 
Since the modern concept of public goods is not imple-
mented, it is possible that district heating systems are to 
a large extent based on heat-only boilers with very small 
annual utilization. the public opportunity costs (of failing 
to produce more valuable products, such as electricity or 
steam) go beyond the scope of a public good defined as 
a state asset—providing cheap heating to a select group 
of citizens. 
in Kosovo, there is a similar fuzziness of competencies in 
relation to the national energy policy. For the time being, 
MEM and, to some extent, unMiK pillar iV are the main 
decision-making bodies. Yet pricing is regulated by Ero, 
and financial management is regulated by the various 
ministries. this has created a situation where MEM may 
be in charge of the development of policies and new leg-
islation, but it is often hindered by financial implications 
that Kosovo’s current budget cannot bear.
there is also ambiguity in Kosovo over the scope of MEM 
and the boundary between its responsibilities and func-
tions and those of the independent Commission for 
Mines and Minerals, notably in terms of who will lead the 
process of securing investment in the lignite-to-power 
sector. the extent of the transfer of powers from unMiK 
to piSG is vague, and the extensive role, functions, and 
duties of the independent Commission for Mines and 
Minerals and lack of defined boundaries give rise to po-
tential conflicts24.
institutional overlap is present in both implementation 
and the legislation development phase. For example, in 
Kosovo the Law on Electricity Efficiency put forward to 
the assembly and the government at the end of 2005 
was retracted by MEM after the Budget Committee de-
The sheer volume of legislation that is 
being passed inevitably leads to legal gaps 
and potential institutional and ministry 
turf warfare.
the other trend noted is that the sheer volume of legisla-
tion that is being passed22 inevitably leads to legal gaps 
and potential institutional and ministry turf warfare. 
implementation to the letter of the law would require 
close and deliberate coordination amongst various insti-
tutions in both Serbia and Kosovo. this coordination is 
less than ideal and has resulted in haphazard practices 
and policies. 
Understanding who is in charge in the energy 
reform process 
institutionally, the key players in energy reform in Serbia 
and Kosovo have competing interests that also com-
plicate official coordination. a more in-depth review of 
these competencies and their capacities will be made in 
the second policy brief, but it is easy to see how primary 
and secondary tasks can get caught up in the larger in-
stitutional crossfire of interests. For example, in Serbia 
energy policy must be coordinated among six different 
ministries and two special agencies. in Kosovo, the en-
ergy reform decisions require two ministries, a regulato-
ry office, an energy enterprise, unMiK, the Kosovo trust 
agency, and the donor community. 
The key players in energy reform in Serbia 
and Kosovo have competing interests that 
also complicate official coordination.
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cided that this draft law had budgetary implications and 
needed to be coordinated with fiscal planning. this led 
the ministry to create the division for energy efficiency, 
which in addition to developing and implementing a 
program on energy efficiency must also ensure that laws 
under consideration do not get around the legislative 
budgetary requirements. 
there is a similar set of contradictions operating in Serbia. 
For example, the Government regulation on import and 
refining of oil and oil products practically restrains the 
importation of oil products. it limits the public benefits 
from the eventual development of a competitive market, 
on the one hand, and affects the value of shares of the 
incumbent oil industry of Serbia in case of its privatiza-
tion: therefore, the public good contradicts the objective 
of cash income to the government budget.
Defining a public good 
a core problem in energy reform is that the legal systems 
in Kosovo and Serbia do not provide adequate guidance 
on how to deal with energy as a public good. the Serbian 
constitution25 stipulates that natural resources are un-
derstood as goods of public interest and, accordingly, are 
state assets. the Kosovo constitutional framework does 
not contain language that declaratively treats energy as 
a public good. as a consequence, public goods are un-
derstood as government owned and potential objects of 
contractual arrangements between the government and 
other entities in accordance with the law. 
For example, a liberal market, competition, clean envi-
ronment, and other common public goods are treated as 
state assets in Serbia and Kosovo. use of these goods is 
then prescribed by various legal acts that assign various 
competencies to appropriate government bodies. inter-
national obligations practically limit the competencies 
of these bodies and are normally seen as an obstacle in 
making use of these public goods turned into state as-
sets. public participation is, therefore, seen as a mere ad-
visory to competent bodies and not as a genuine expres-
sion of the public interest. 
this has resulted in legal systems that remain procedural 
and require much more detailed directives than would 
be normally expected. Competent bodies would be bet-
ter able to implement their respective competencies if 
these were described in detail and properly distinct from 
the competencies of other bodies. 
However, since the nature of public goods is general, it is 
difficult to make distinctions required by the Serbian and 
Kosovar legal systems. Consequently, competent bodies 
compete for control of various segments within a par-
ticular domain. at the level of secondary legislation, any 
competent body is likely to attempt to insulate its area of 
responsibility/control from other similar bodies. there is 
little cooperation between competent bodies but plenty 
of negotiations on the distinction of competencies. it is 
very difficult for a concerned public to address a particu-
lar body and eventually advocate solutions. 
For example, in Kosovo and Serbia the concept of a 
“Socially owned Enterprise” (SoE) is considered part of 
public goods. Consequently, SoEs, such as power plants, 
get caught up in the legal wrangling of different gov-
ernment institutions. the result is often delayed action 
or nontransparent actions. in Kosovo’s case, it has taken 
years for both international and domestic political ac-
tors to take responsibility and intervene on “behalf of the 
public” in the Kosovo Electric Company (KEK)26. Year after 
year, this SoE has suffered massive financial losses and is 
still unable to provide a consistent supply of electricity27. 
only in 2006 was a working group set up by unMiK and 
piSG initiative to take on the politically unpopular deci-
sions necessary to make KEK a viable enterprise. Yet the 
long-term strategic plan to make KEK viable is still vul-
nerable to legal sidestepping of responsibilities, which 
has allowed the situation to reach its current dire state.
Because the concept of public goods lacks 
legislative clarity, power plants and other 
SOEs often get caught up in the legal 
wrangling of different governmental insti-
tutions.
the task of addressing environmental concerns is also 
more difficult without a demonstrated legal means of 
recognizing public goods. Little information on the en-
ergy sector and its environmental impacts is available in 
the public domain, either in Serbia or Kosovo. 
in Serbia, prevailing laws on the environment, spatial 
planning, and energy provide for the transparency and 
availability of information ex post when a particular de-
cision, study, or analysis is already drafted. theoretically, 
a concerned public could appeal to the authorities and 
eventually apply for judicial protection if possessing the 
financial resources to do so; however, this is a cumber-
some and untested process. 
in Kosovo, despite considerable international assistance 
in planning energy development and reform, making 
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data available and including environmental and other 
relevant actors in the decision-making process has been 
extremely low. this stems partly from the fact that the 
results presented in the reports are often so poor that 
there is little political will to tackle these issues—the re-
ports often just lie gathering dust. 
“non core” businesses-privatization of the oil industry has 
not been completed, while the available privatization 
strategy calls for the sale of minority stakes in compa-
nies with “managerial” rights. this has created a situation 
where a considerable number of public goods/state as-
sets are assigned under the control of public companies. 
although these companies do not own the assets29, the 
case of the oil industry of Serbia30 demonstrates that the 
assets could be simply assigned to the company through 
the process of its “corporatization.” Considered as com-
ponents of public administration, these companies have 
unlimited access to public-goods-turned-state-assets, 
which creates a considerable obstacle for the eventual 
privatization of such companies in conformity with the 
Extractive industries transparency initiative (Eiti). Fur-
thermore, the government administration does not cur-
rently have the capacity to govern public goods that will 
eventually be assigned to private operators instead of 
public companies. 
the process of privatizing the SoE of KEK in Kosovo is 
even more complicated. unbundling the various parts of 
KEK, as well as the need for a status decision, have effec-
tively meant that most decisions and their assignment to 
different competencies have been put on hold.
What all this means in practice 
Both Serbia and Kosovo suffer from inefficient, highly 
pollutive, and expensive energy production and distribu-
tion. Kosovo is committed to becoming a power exporter 
after 2012 and to further reinforce its central role in fa-
cilitating power in the SEE region, yet on a daily basis, 
Kosovo suffers power shortages. Even with its envisioned 
brighter future as an energy exporter, if it does not liter-
ally clean up its act in building up the capacity of Kosovo 
C, real costs will be high31.
Energy intensity is exceptionally high in Serbia and has 
worsened over time32.
the Serbian economy is also carbon intensive, with a 
carbon intensity 6.6 times more than the world average 
and almost 11 times more than the oECd average. How-
ever, energy consumption per capita is almost 2.5 times 
less than the oECd average. this indicates that electric-
ity consumption is inefficient in terms of value creation. 
More tellingly, the majority of the energy inefficiency is 
clustered in the most densely populated areas, where 
most of the production potential (ports, railways, indus-
try, and navigable waterways) is concentrated. and con-
sumption dynamics demonstrate that energy efficiency 
deteriorates while consumption of the most potentially 
Overall, there is little understanding of the 
public benefits from reform in the energy 
sector.
another reason is that the donor community often fo-
cuses on one aspect of the energy sector and targets the 
reports toward one organization. For example, the Euro-
pean agency for reconstruction (Ear) earlier conducted 
an “Environmental impact assessment and action plan 
for Kosovo a and B power plants and Coal Mines,” but 
since the study was prepared for KEK, it more or less re-
mained in the realm of KEK. political will to “follow up” on 
such international reports has been missing as ministry 
responsibility or overall political responsibility can be 
easily passed around.
this has resulted in very low public awareness of the 
depth and scope of the problems that have accumulat-
ed in the sector. Consequently, both the general public 
and legislature have given insufficient attention to the 
functioning of the sector and actual obligations. overall, 
there is little understanding of the public benefits from 
reform in the energy sector. related obligations are seen 
as externally driven rather than domestically demanded, 
and political will to reform the sector in the manner re-
quired is not sufficient.
the concept of public good is also critical when consid-
ering the issue of privatization. Each government has 
taken on the task of privatizing portions of the energy 
sector with a set of administrative regulations and direc-
tives, but given the lack of a clear legal understanding 
of public good, designing a privatization and tender 
process that is transparent is extremely challenging. this 
combined with the tendency to see privatization as the 
solution to all problems and the political jostling that in-
evitably occurs when “dividing up the spoils” has resulted 
in political interest to privatize but little political will to 
adhere to all of the international obligations regulating 
this process.
For example, Serbia agreed to privatize its oil industry 
through an Extended iMF arrangement beginning in 
June 200528. although the restructuring of state-owned 
energy companies is on the way-notably, by spinning off 
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productive forms of energy increases. that means that 
Serbia is spending more and more high-quality energy 
(electricity, petroleum products) for disproportionately 
small Gdp gains.  
in essence, although Serbia operates some of the larg-
est European industrial complexes of this nature, it lacks 
capacity to provide sufficient governance resources and 
performance. and similarly, while Kosovo has potentially 
the largest new source of energy and may serve as an en-
ergy exporter, it currently lacks the necessary governance 
framework to realize these plans. the steps necessary to 
move forward in the energy reform process and achieve 
energy security are already known; the roadmap—while 
ambitious—is clear. now policy priority must be given to 
developing, enforcing, and coordinating the energy re-
form process.
recommendations
to the governments of serbia and Kosovo:
Ratification of Complementary International Ob- »
ligations: the Serbian and Kosovar legislatures are 
to be informed and encouraged to request acces-
sion to and then ratify the Energy Charter treaty, 
the Kyoto protocol to unFCCC, aarhus Conven-
tion, and Eiti compact before any further and 
major restructuring or privatization in the energy 
sector. parliament members should be provided 
with access to knowledge and information on 
these major international compacts and also with 
the sufficient means to oversee their application 
and enforcement. 
In order to better coordinate energy policy reform and im-
plementation:
Develop Law on Implementation of the Energy  »
Community Treaty: the Serbian and Kosovar 
legislatures would be advised to consider the 
drafting and adoption of a Law on implementa-
tion of the Energy Community treaty that could 
assign obligations to various competent au-
thorities, establish coordination mechanism be-
tween them, and set up appropriate timelines 
for institutional, legal, and factual adjustments. 
 
For example, the Serbian Energy Efficiency 
agency could be upgraded to resume the 
role of policy broker between various govern-
ment institutions in order to shape policy and 
legislation toward better energy efficiency. 
 
and in Kosovo, there should be new attempts to 
pass the law by which an independent Kosovo 
Energy Efficiency agency could be created. in the 
case that there are high budgetary implications 
Serbia Energy Fact Sheet
Energy intensity is exceptionally high: •	
TPES per unit of GDP ratio is 5 times 
more than the world average and 8 times 
more than the OECD average.
Carbon intensity is 6.6 times more than •	
the world average and almost 11 times 
more than the OECD average.
Electricity consumption is inefficient in •	
terms of value creation.
Energy inefficiency is clustered in the •	
most densely populated areas.
Serbia is spending increasing amounts of •	
high-quality energy (electricity, petro-
leum products) for disproportionately 
small GDP gains.
Kosovo Energy Fact Sheet
In 2003, KEK lost about 43 percent of •	
its generated electricity to technical and 
commercial losses.
KEK was able to collect only 72 percent •	
of the remaining 57 percent of electricity 
that was billed.
Businesses estimate that power shortages •	
and the need to use backup generators 
add 10 percent to their overall costs.
Lignite reserves are considered sufficient •	
to provide Kosovo with energy for sev-
eral hundred years.
Kosovar government plans to build a •	
2,100 MW power plant called Kosovo C.
Kosovo is committed to becoming a •	
power exporter after 2012.
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for the passage of this law, the legislation could 
be broken down into fiscally acceptable portions 
with the creation of the agency as one of its priori-
ties.
Invigorate use of complementary legislation:  » Both 
Kosovo and Serbia need to bring their comple-
mentary legislation up to date with international 
obligations. this includes forcefully applying new 
laws, such as an access to information act, as well 
as passing laws on concessions.
Modernize legal concept of public goods: »  there is 
a need to implement a modern concept of public 
goods throughout the Serbian and Kosovar legal 
systems and to infuse legislation development, 
interpretation, and implementation with this con-
cept, particularly in regard to increased public ac-
cess to decision making.
Bring public goods and energy debate to the pub- »
lic: initiate a process of public dialogue based on 
the suggestions and recommendations of the 
aarhus Convention for informing citizens about 
the opportunities, challenges, problems, and 
environmental and social limitations of energy 
reform, including well-coordinated conceptual 
work and an awareness campaign on educating 
about public goods and raising public concern. 
Civil society work, education of journalists, and 
intensive publishing are needed to inform and 
mobilize the general and concerned public and 
eventually advocate substantial improvements. 
 
one first step in this regard would be the creation 
of a central database for energy reform matters, 
which would provide a common forum for all in-
formation that concerns this sector. 
Increase resources to the judicial system for new  »
energy reform legislation: the judicial systems of 
Serbia and Kosovo should be provided with the 
means, information, and knowledge to imple-
ment new legislation. Competent professional 
witnesses should be made available to courts 
and the appropriate training of judges organized. 
to the European Union and International community:
Clearly coordinate energy reform with all respon- »
sible domestic actors: Ensure that technical coop-
eration and research products, such as assessment 
reports, are done in coordination with all relevant 
domestic actors in a manner that encourages 
more rather than less domestic-level cooperation 
on energy reform.
Regardless of status, engage with Kosovo as a full  »
energy partner: regardless of the status outcome, 
Kosovo should be seen as a full-fledged partner in 
any regional initiative in the field of energy.
Provide more publicly available data: »  the 
level of publicly available information (sta-
tistics, environmental information, pub-
lic accounting) should be improved in 
terms of quality, quantity, and availability. 
 
there is a need to empower public organizations 
that collect and disseminate data, from inspection 
authorities to statistical office and spatial plan-
ning agencies. Within the scope of the SEE Energy 
Community treaty, member countries and the Eu 
should endeavor to establish a clear obligation for 
members to collect, process, and disseminate in a 
timely and suitable manner statistical and techni-
cal data required normally by Eurostat and iEa, as 
well as environmental data that are Eu standard. 
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national energy strategies in Kosovo and Serbia only 
provide a partial blueprint for reaching the energy se-
curity envisioned by both. Each national policy has been 
matched to international commitments, but their actual 
implementation appears to be stymied from reaching 
the stated European objectives.
While both national strategies have only been in place 
for a few years, it is already clear that conceptual gaps 
form a key challenge for the development of compre-
hensive policies that would address the various cost, 
infrastructure and environmental difficulties both Serbia 
and Kosovo face. unclear and conflicting institutional 
responsibilities, poor intra-ministry coordination, and 
sketchy governance and oversight of the energy sector 
in each government have further contributed to the per-
ception that energy policies are created in a black box.
the key to opening this black box is the further anchor-
ing of energy policies to European standards and pro-
cesses. Challenging each government to both envision 
itself as already part of a European energy market and to 
adhere to European governance standards will allow for 
more creative solutions and for meaningful participation 
by experts and concerned citizens in the policy process. 
infusing European standards into the mix also provides 
a base from which to explore regional options for the 
domestic energy security that both Kosovo and Serbia 
desire. Key recommendations include:
to the governments of Serbia and Kosovo:
Establish systematic review processes for national  »
energy policies, with special emphasis on improv-
ing energy efficiency in a way that accurately re-
flects changes both domestically and in the wider 
European energy environment.
develop coordination mechanisms among minis- »
tries and government bodies critical to overall en-
ergy policy in order to improve implementation 
and oversight.
increase the inclusion of civil society in the energy  »
policy making process in order to boost public 
participation in and support for the energy reform 
process. 
to the European union and international Community:
dedicate more resources to the governance of  »
energy related reforms in order to ensure that the 
process of energy reform is both sustainable and 
in line with Eu good governance objectives
methodology and Background
Energy security in Serbia and Kosovo is not an abstract 
concept, but rather a daily struggle for many who depend 
on intermittent electricity for work and home, worry 
about financing winter heating, or have concerns about 
the environmental effects of their energy consumption.
Energy security is also a shared European ideal, and ac-
cordingly one that requires both domestic and regional 
strategies for success. the foundation of energy security 
is a stable legal environment. as described in the previ-
ous brief, governments in both Serbia and Kosovo have 
begun the process of aligning their legislative frame-
works with declared international commitments on en-
ergy reform. 
a second component in the reform process is the de-
velopment and implementation of energy policies that 
serve as a blueprint for carrying out the individual reform 
steps. Similarly to the design of energy related legisla-
tion, Serbia and Kosovo share both a legacy and current 
challenges in developing energy policies that realistical-
ly portray domestic competitive advantages and at least 
medium term horizons. 
the governments of Serbia and Kosovo have exhibited 
commitment to enacting energy policies that will ad-
dress the current challenges each faces in managing 
their energy sector in line with international commit-
ments. Both have tasked themselves with overhauling 
historically jumbled or incomplete policies in a way that 
will fuel internal energy needs and provide the basis for 
the envisioned economic development and European in-
tegration that each seeks. 
Energy policies in both Serbia and Kosovo have been en-
visioned through 2015. the technical aspects of which 
energy resource is more efficient, cost effective or clean-
er are well documented in a number of domestic and in-
ternational studies. Yet a closer look at the actual details 
of these policies reveals a number of gaps in coherence, 
abilities, and processes in relation to both international 
commitments and stated domestic objectives. 
perhaps most critically, further work is needed on how 
these technical plans fit with the larger economic devel-
opment objectives of each government and how to en-
sure that the process of getting to energy security at the 
same time complies with and reinforces other ongoing 
reform processes in Serbia and Kosovo. 
in order to further this critical process, the European 
Movement in Serbia and KiprEd Kosovo through help of 
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energy and policy experts, set about to highlight which 
areas of domestic energy policy reform need further 
modification and to encourage further opportunities for 
civil society consultations and inputs into the processes.
national strategies – legacies
the history of energy policy in Serbia and Kosovo is short 
or long depending on how you view the events of the 
past century. But both were affected by the fact that 
energy policy was often made in relation to external in-
terests, with political rather than economic and resource 
considerations, and with quite short time horizons. tack-
ling this historic legacy is one of the biggest challenges 
facing officials in Serbia and Kosovo as they develop Ser-
bia and Kosovo-focused energy strategies.
the development of a thermal power plant in Kraguje-
vac and a hydropower plant in Krusevac ushered in the 
beginning of electrification in the late 19th century to 
Serbia. But these initiatives were more local and private 
than part of any grand energy policy. and it was only 
after World War ii that a national energy policy was es-
tablished for the area of the former Yugoslavia. a key 
component of this energy policy was the development 
of hydro energy potential. this, combined with develop-
ment in industrial capacity which allowed the process-
ing of imported fuels in cogeneration facilities, provided 
considerable improvements in the production and use of 
energy throughout the former Yugoslavia.
a major shift in energy policy (and economic develop-
ment policy) from the mid 1970’s re-oriented the energy 
industry toward indigenous fuels (lignite) and the cen-
tralized district heating systems characteristic of planned 
economies. For electricity, a commercial structure (elec-
tricity generation, transmission and distribution entirely 
unbundled) was retained with commercial relations es-
tablished between these essentially state-owned com-
panies throughout Yugoslavia.
But perhaps more importantly, a political shift from fo-
cusing on commercially viable energy resources and the 
most efficient use of energy resources within Yugoslavia 
was replaced by the official doctrine that energy resourc-
es, in Serbia’s case lignite, were abundant and virtually 
limitless. For Serbia specifically – while it became a net 
electricity exporter – these policies put a heavy burden 
on its resource base and had devastating effects on its 
terms of trade.
Similarly in Kosovo, energy policy focused on achieving 
some level of self sufficiency, with the lignite reserves 
to fuel economic growth, while not thinking of the long 
term sustainability and development considerations. En-
ergy was readily available, but its cost was not accurately 
represented. Electrification started in the 1930’s, but it 
was only in the mid 1980’s that full electrification was 
achieved in Kosovo. 
the Kosovo a power plant was started in 1960 and it be-
came the largest power plant in the Balkans. Kosovo a, 
with the help of a second plant built in the 1970’s, Koso-
vo B, brought steady growth in energy production and 
usage in Kosovo. For example, an analysis of the curves 
of consumption and production show that, from 1980 to 
1988, electricity consumption increased at a very high 
rate (consumption for example rose for 9.1% per an-
num). overall, the most successful years of the plant and 
energy provision in Kosovo were from the mid 1970’s 
through the 1980’s after which production and quality 
steadily declined (more than a threefold reduction) to 
the point of significant power shortages starting in 2000. 
Consumption patterns also, like in Serbia, drastically 
changed with an increase in household and service sec-
tor consumption while industrial use declined.
other portions of energy policy fed into this new politi-
cal doctrine. While municipal gasification in Serbia still 
kept up its chaotic pace and was left to private and local 
initiative in similar way as electrification had been half 
a century before, the development of new refineries, oil 
pipeline and gas pipelines as well as district heating sys-
tems (as major consumers of heavy fuel oil and natural 
gas at one end, and providers of heating services to ur-
ban dwellers at the other) had more political overtones 
and made both Serbia and Kosovo more dependent on 
energy imports and limited transport routes. Energy pro-
vision became increasingly more expensive and resulted 
in prioritizing higher energy intensity and lower energy 
efficiency. 
at the end of the 1980’s and beginning of 1990’s, Serbia 
and Kosovo experienced another shift in energy policy. 
a recollecting of energy resources under tighter state 
control took effect. Vertically integrated energy utilities 
(niS – oil and gas and EpS – lignite and electricity) were 
established and, insufficient, commercial relations were 
replaced by a type of vertical coordination that is still in 
place today in Serbia. in Kosovo, a similar vertical re-in-
tegration of utilities took place through the Elektroeko-
nomia of Kosovo, and now the Electricity utility (KEK) is 
the legacy institution upon which a new Kosovo energy 
policy began to be constructed and unbundled in 2005 
with the creation of the Kosovo transmission office. 
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today’s energy scene
Serbia is deficient in energy resources both in terms of 
available volume and quality. only hydro potential and 
agricultural biomass are available in concentration and 
quality that could be competitive with similar resources 
elsewhere in Europe. Conventional energy resources 
(natural gas, oil and coal) are limited in volumes or qual-
ity. Given the scarcity of domestically available resources, 
Serbia has little option but to be import-dependent. in 
addition, as a landlocked country the costs of obtaining 
energy for Serbia are relatively high. 
one of the major objectives of Serbian energy policy over 
the last three decades was to moderate import depen-
dence by extensive use of domestic energy resources. 
that policy objective was achieved with very high costs 
in terms of international competitiveness of the national 
economy. the development of energy-intensive industry 
and deterioration of energy efficiency in effect separated 
energy policy from economic policy and dynamics of the 
gross domestic product. in terms of available transport 
capacities, Serbia remained relatively closed: import and 
export volumes are small in comparison with domestic 
material throughout, and this trend is growing. 
paradoxically, Kosovo has not been short of energy re-
sources both in terms of volume and quality. While cur-
rent lignite resources in the Bardh and Mirach mines are 
due to expire in 2008/9, with likely extension through 
2012, significant energy resources are allocated in two 
big lignite basins, named “Kosova” and “dukagjini” with 
lignite exploitable reserves of relatively good quality34. 
Yet despite some progress in developing and imple-
menting energy policy in the past eight years, the elec-
tricity supply is still intermittent and depends heavily on 
government subsidies. the energy crisis remains one of 
the greatest obstacles to economic growth and human 
security in Kosovo and, accordingly, has focused much 
attention on the need to develop new energy policies to 
address current limitations.
crafting of energy policies 
Ministries in Serbia and Kosovo, with the help of both in-
ternational and domestic technical experts, have designed 
energy policies to guide policy makers through 201535. in 
principle, these policies are based on the Energy Com-
munity treaty of 2005 and other international legal obli-
gations related to bringing systems up to European and 
international standards. Each focuses on plans to improve 
domestic production and capacities while keeping an eye 
on new technologies and further regional integration. 
For example, the areas highlighted for Kosovo36 include 
ways to stimulate energy consumption in a more rational 
way, use renewable energy resources, adopt new energy 
technologies through research and development and 
provide adequate infrastructure for the energy sector 
and for a growing economy. 
though slightly different in emphasis, the strategy out-
line of Serbia37 reads very similarly; in essence, the de-
velopment strategies for energy provide for Kosovo and 
Serbia’s economic development possibilities. However, a 
closer examination of the policy objectives suggests that 
more attention needs to be given to several fundamental 
areas of development.
re-assessment of objectives
Most of the historic shifts in Yugoslav energy policy were 
implicit, with little or no policy documents publicly avail-
able. now for the first time, both Serbia and Kosovo have 
undertaken a public process to design their energy poli-
cies. in Serbia, all documents are available, outlining the 
country’s energy policy to 2015. in Kosovo, the outlined 
national policy both heavily relies on World Bank and do-
mestic experts’ feedback38 as well as suggestions coming 
out of public hearings in 2005. 
However, these more public processes had still been 
steeped in ‘established facts and assumptions’ of earlier 
thinking. and this resulted in fewer innovations and pos-
sibilities to critically examine core policy assumptions.
For example, Serbia’s historical dependence on lignite 
for energy, despite its costs, has only been partially re-
considered. in the new Serbian Energy Strategy, depen-
dence on domestic lignite has shifted somewhat to the 
creation of additional hydropower generation capacity 
through refurbishment of existing plants and the con-
Energy policies, though newly designed, 
are steeped in ‘established facts and as-
sumptions’ of earlier Yugoslav energy 
policy.
struction of new ones by 2012. nevertheless, a good 
portion of power is still expected to be generated us-
ing existing and new open-pit mines to supply thermal 
power stations and to supply additional units already in 
the planning stages during the 2012-2015 period. Given 
its domestic resources, it is likely that lignite will contin-
ue to be a core resource for energy production in Serbia. 
Few opportunities to better use existing resources to 
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foster energy efficiency are envisioned, but it is not clear 
whether this is as a result of careful cost-benefit analysis 
and creative thinking or simply the slight modification of 
energy policy of the previous decades. 
in Kosovo (as in Serbia), there is a healthy amount of 
skepticism on the reality of full energy policy implemen-
tation. the current strategy draws heavily on recent stud-
ies conducted only for Kosovo, and to some extent has 
escaped the legacy of Yugoslav energy policy thinking. 
But as a counterpoint, its assumptions intuitively focus 
on domestic predominance of energy resources (lignite), 
without a careful assessment of whether this is the most 
realistic option for long-term growth. internally, the de-
bate in Kosovo revolves around whether lignite should 
be primarily used for the needs of Kosovo or as the larg-
est form of export. the debate does not include much 
strategizing on whether or how Kosovo needs to diver-
sify its energy resources beyond lignite. this is partly due 
to the deep concern of both administrations that relying 
on lignite (despite high costs/low efficiency extraction in 
comparison with imported fuels) is still more dependable 
and sufficient than relying on regional and European in-
tegration for energy security, irrespective of provisions 
set out in the Stabilization and association process (Sap) 
and the Energy Community treaty.
Infusion of innovation to address technical 
issues
Some of these concerns could be partially addressed with 
a more systematic method of updating and review of the 
designed energy policies. Serbia’s energy policy was cre-
ated in 2004, yet there has not been any serious annual 
review of its targets and objectives in view of the larger 
energy field or overall national development strategies.  
For example in terms of energy efficiency, experts sug-
gest that steps such as the (1) more efficient and pro-
ductive use of natural gas for electricity generation with 
co-generation of heat; the (2) introduction of imported 
hard-coal to diversify imported energy sources and im-
prove efficiency of lignite combustion; the (3) co-firing of 
biomass in existing lignite boilers to moderate environ-
mental impacts; and the (4) use of heat pumps as a main 
and internationally competitive heating option, to make 
use of renewable heat energy (air or geothermal), could 
go a long way towards improving efficiency and cleanli-
ness of existing resources. 
Similarly in Kosovo, the international data used in the 
energy policies is already a few years old – generated in 
2002, with updates in 2004. However, since the Kosovo 
administration has depended on short-term internation-
al expertise to provide major inputs into the energy strat-
egy, little revision has been attempted in the past years. 
For example, the recently designed framework for the 
“Kosovo programme for Energy Efficiency and renew-
able Energy resources for the period of 2007-2009” still 
primarily relies on data gathered around 2002. imple-
mentation of this admittedly ambitious plan has barely 
begun, partially due to the fact that it assumes and an-
ticipates a better implementation environment than yet 
exists. rather, the reality is still low payment of electricity 
tariffs, poor functioning of KEK, budgetary problems.
coordination with complementary policies
Economic development
Energy reform strategies of both Serbia and Kosovo in-
clude a clear need for coordination with overall develop-
ment plans as well as between key ministries. an annual 
review of specific energy policies is crucial for coordina-
tion with the overall economic development strategies 
of Serbia and Kosovo. Energy is a baseline component 
of development strategies, yet too often in both Kosovo 
and Serbia specific energy interests have skewed policy 
makers from considering the big picture. Serbia has such 
a development strategy, but its actual implementation 
status is unknown. in Kosovo’s case, the overall eco-
nomic development strategy has not yet been approved. 
nonetheless, improving policy makers’ ability to broadly 
match energy and economic objectives in both Serbia 
and Kosovo is possible and necessary in order to develop 
plans based on realistic, complementary, and sequential 
strategies. 
transport and infrastructure
More specifically, mechanisms for assessing how specific 
policies in the area of transportation and infrastructure 
affect energy policy and vice versa are not comprehen-
sively in place. in Serbia, the national Gas Supply plan and 
the national investment plan are being implemented in 
the energy sector and critical investments in infrastruc-
ture envisaged by these national documents range from 
enlarging the natural gas network to the building of an 
underground storage39. Missing in this set of strategies, 
though, is a more comprehensive merging of transporta-
tion/infrastructure and energy goals. For example, trans-
port of energy is already major part of Serbia transport 
requirements. transport of lignite, hard coal, fuel wood, 
oil and oil products and natural gas already account for 
major part of transport services in the country. While 
transport of lignite is well organized and achieves high 
transport productivity in terms of mass and volumes, its 
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performance in terms of transported energy or economic 
values remains very poor as in essence high quality en-
ergy (electricity, petroleum products) are used to move 
large quantities of low economic value material. 
Kosovo has specific policies for improving the infrastruc-
ture for the transmission of electricity as well as more 
general plans of what to do to reactivate the infrastruc-
ture for further gasification of Kosovo, but these sector-
specific infrastructure projects/objectives only partially 
address the full infrastructure needs laid out in the en-
ergy plan. For example, no feasibility study has yet been 
done on re-building the 100km or so natural gas pipeline 
into Kosovo and thus any serious consideration of alter-
native energy policies focused on natural gas cannot cur-
rently be contemplated40. Storage of energy, a problem 
listed in the overall energy policy, is not addressed by 
specific plans for infrastructure upgrades by the respon-
sible ministries.
Environment
Environmental targets for energy emissions are set in the 
energy policies of Serbia and Kosovo. in addition, certain 
environmental requirements are outlined in the Euro-
pean standards legislation as well as larger international 
treaty obligations. Yet very little coordination between 
the ministries of environment and ministries of energy/
mining has been present during the development and 
implementation of the larger energy policies.
rather, environment issues are often added to a list of 
things that can be checked off as ‘completed’ when con-
sidering various energy policy options. this has led to 
a partial view of the real ecological costs likely to result 
from taking on a particular energy policy action. overall, 
there is serious discrepancy between exploitation dy-
namics and minimizing their environmental costs, with 
energy given predominance over environmental con-
cerns, stemming from the high political priority placed 
on energy production and transmission. a more in-depth 
look at the actual ecological cost of this trade-off in en-
ergy reform will be the focus of the third policy brief, but 
for the purposes of understanding coordination dynam-
ics, it is safe to say that environmental and energy minis-
tries must tackle partially competing interests. 
European integration
all of these ministries and strategies eventually fall under 
the European union integration rubric. Yet in Serbia the 
level of systematic coordination between the ministry of 
energy and the country’s Eu integration office is very low. 
Basic information sharing is not done on a regular basis 
and consultation and inputs into policy programs do not 
necessarily include European integration office consid-
erations. Given that each government is committed to 
reaching its European standards requirements, whether 
as part a Stabilization and association agreement (Saa) 
or other integration processes, designing some type of 
coordinating mechanism or even allowing some type of 
oversight by the governmental body tasked which reach-
ing European compliance would be critical.
clearer and more realistic mechanisms for re-
gional cooperation 
Each energy strategy includes as an objective better re-
gional cooperation on transport and integration of ener-
gy grids. Yet these objectives are not matched by specific 
steps in the policy plan to reach an enhanced regional 
energy policy. on the level of high politics, and partic-
ularly in the area of transport, there is some progress 
however. For example, Serbia is engaged in a regional 
initiative to develop a pan European oil and Gas pipeline 
corridor from Constanta (romania) to trieste in italy. and 
in Kosovo, the reconstruction of the electricity sector ap-
pears to be taking into consideration both Kosovo’s com-
petitive advantages and the regional Market of Electric-
ity of SEE and potentially increased energy cooperation 
with albania. However, on closer examination the actual 
domestic policies have very little in the way of concrete 
methods and steps for coordination. 
Basic agreements or frameworks for discussing tariff 
transfers between the region’s energy markets are not 
as developed as larger political framework agreements 
on cooperation, but it is exactly an agreement on such 
technical terms that will allow experts and policy makers 
to envision more options for the respective energy provi-
sions of both Kosovo and Serbia. 
For example, it is unclear whether the recommended de-
sign of the electricity market for Kosovo in a transitional 
model (MttEE)41 (which takes steps for competing on 
the local and regional market) can actually be realized 
without further agreements with neighbors; or whether 
the development of a full circle of gas networks in Koso-
vo would require a clear political and technical commit-
ment of Macedonia and Serbia in order to be realized. 
But such projects are not mentioned in either energy 
policy. nothing is in the ‘pipeline,’ so to speak, in either 
energy policy beyond the high-profile projects of pipe-
lines that would address the day-to-day needs of basic 
energy transport/transmission, and storage. in essence, 
the markets in Serbia and Kosovo are so fragmented and 
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focused on domestic energy security based on lignite 
that it is impossible to understand how to see this in a 
larger picture of optimal common energy markets and 
energy security within the region.
Anchoring energy reform to European strategies: 
Imagining 2020 
Considerations of the larger European energy field and 
European energy reforms are generally missing from the 
energy strategies of Kosovo and Serbia. despite nominal 
compliance with the various European standards areas 
outlined both in the acquis communautaire and the En-
ergy Community treaty, both strategies fall short of envi-
sioning and coordinating their energy policies as part of 
a larger regional and European energy policy.
this is most clearly demonstrated by the fact that nei-
ther policy takes into account European 2020 targets 
for renewable energy and levels of pollution – current 
plans only extend to 2015. While it is likely that a revi-
sion of 2015 and further plans will be made before 2015, 
development of mechanisms for communication among 
policy and regional experts as well as European union 
expert colleagues has been modest. the establishment 
of an interim Energy Community Secretariat (supported 
by a CardS regional program at the end of 2005) and the 
European Commission’s 2007 decision to draw up priority 
energy infrastructure projects under the tEns44 are a good 
start, but as of yet, few common projects have emerged 
that would facilitate coordination or focus on the joint 
commitments that have been undertaken by the govern-
ments in the region, particularly in relation to improving 
energy security and local economic development.
Energy policies, though newly designed, 
are steeped in ‘established facts and as-
sumptions’ of earlier Yugoslav energy 
policy.
the planning to actually meet the ambitious 2020 goals 
needs to be taken on as early as possible. Both Serbia and 
Kosovo would like to imagine themselves firmly within 
the European union structure by 2020, and accordingly 
energy policy should reflect these political objectives. 
For example, compliance with the Eu environmental 
standards as envisaged by the Energy Community treaty 
are likely to add both capital and running costs to which-
ever resource option is embraced. these costs should 
be properly calculated and figured into domestic plans 
earlier rather than later, particularly if the most reason-
able option turns out to be crafting regional and wider 
integration options to ensure energy security. 
European union funding for overall energy reform in the 
form of CardS and other programs has been a significant 
source of assistance to the governments in Serbia42 and 
Kosovo43. priorities in funding and technical assistance 
have been on overall assessments of the markets, on the 
unbundling of utilities, and on regulatory mechanisms 
for the energy markets. 
accordingly, support for more collaborative efforts or the 
Serbia and energy privatization:
There are a few small private/foreign 
owned gas distributors; 
Some domestic (maintenance) service pro-
viders and energy equipment vendors have 
already been privatized; 
Privatization of the major river transport 
company JRB (whose transport capacity 
for coal, oil and oil products is critical for 
supply security) is on the way; 
More than half of fuelling stations are 
privately owned including ownership of 
international companies (LukOil, MOL, 
Hellenic Petroleum, Petrol and OMV). 
Privatization of the Oil Company of Serbia 
(NIS) has been delayed for more than one 
year.
capacities to take on the policy challenges 
and reforms
Energy reform is a high priority for the governments of 
Serbia and Kosovo, but in an environment where almost 
all ministries are undergoing structural reforms, it is inevi-
table that certain institutional capacities and approaches 
are missing. While public administration and its institu-
tions related to the energy sector need more capacity, 
resources and skills as well as better defined scope, the 
critical question is institutional independence and the 
corporatization of public companies active in the energy 
sector. 
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Both in Serbia and Kosovo, decision-making in these com-
panies is too dependent on related decisions in a num-
ber of administrative institutions. Since the administra-
tions own both companies and the assets (and the public 
goods) that they use, there is little freedom for manage-
rial initiative and commercial achievements. industries 
and companies are potential sources of innovation, and 
subordinating these (potentially commercial) entities to 
public administrations which are not structured for com-
mercial or technological innovation implies considerable 
opportunity loss, while providing little guarantee of ac-
tual institutional transparency and oversight.
Level of independence of institutions dealing 
with energy reform
Legally, as described in the previous brief, the respon-
sibilities for energy policy overlap and contain gaps. a 
quick look at the organizational charts (See appendix 
B and C) for Serbia (6 ministries and 2 special agencies) 
and Kosovo (2 ministries, a regulatory office, an energy 
enterprise, unMiK, the Kosovo trust agency, and the 
donor community) highlights that the actual implemen-
tation of energy policy has its own level of controlled 
chaos. these structural and legal inconsistencies have 
led to increased efforts to enforce greater parliamentary 
oversight on overall reform and particularly in the area of 
privatization within the energy sector.
privatization in the energy sector reflects the overall frag-
mented approach of energy policy implementation. the 
pickings within the sector are quite attractive for both 
domestic and international investors and accordingly 
the risk of unregulated decision making and potential 
corrupt practices is considerable.
From a strategic perspective, piecemeal, partial, and de-
layed privatization in previous years has meant that over-
sight of the entire process and how it fits the larger stra-
tegic energy objectives has not been part of the review 
process. Specific parliamentary oversight over this macro 
approach has not been envisioned and, accordingly, the 
result is that particular energy interests have gained poli-
cy access without a governance counterweight. 
Since privatization is actually a government-private part-
nership this matters a great deal. For example, the Ser-
bian public company EpS is now preparing tenders to 
find a private investor for additional lignite fired power 
plants in its obrenovac lignite complex. Electricity pro-
duction from these plants is mostly for domestic supply 
(where prices are determined by the Government with 
the assistance of the regulatory agency) while EpS itself 
is going to provide fuel – lignite for electricity genera-
tion that implies a predetermined rent on the envisaged 
investment.
Kosovo and energy privatization
The majority of the socially owned en-
terprises (SOEs) have been successfully 
privatized during the past 29 rounds of 
privatization conducted by the KTA. 
 
Of energy producers, only Hydropower 
Plant Kozhnjer in Deqan has been priva-
tized since 2004; everything else remains 
in the unbundling process of KEK.
There are an estimated 1000 petrol sta-
tions. Most are privately owned and were 
built after the conflict. For those socially 
owned, the company Kosova Petrol is op-
erating in cooperation with the petrol sta-
tions of Croatian INA. These pumps were 
previously under the banner of Beopetrol 
and Jugo petrol companies.
in Kosovo, KEK – the vertically integrated power utility 
of Kosovo that comprises of coal mining, power genera-
tion, transmission & dispatch, distribution and supply – is 
currently in the midst of the complex incorporation and 
unbundling process. the process was supposed to be 
completed by the end of 2006, but inevitably has taken 
longer given the complicated set of actors and their con-
cerns that need to be consulted and considered during 
the decisionmaking process45. the KEK privatization will 
serve as a model for the sector, so getting it right will be 
crucial for transparency and oversight of the other en-
ergy assets at stake. 
the key barrier to realizing the privatization is the issue 
of governance surrounding KEK. KEK is a publicly owned 
Enterprise (poE), and the sui generis framework for the 
governance of the public enterprise sector in Kosovo is 
unclear. the basic problem is a mismatch of control and 
accountability, whereby the Kosovo trust agency (Kta) is 
responsible for administering the poEs in Kosovo, but it 
does not bear fiduciary responsibility; and the provision-
al institutions of Self-Government (piSG) are responsible 
for the budget, but have no statutory control over the 
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poEs. While this framework will likely be modified with 
status decisions, it has made the current process of priva-
tizing and oversight challenging, to say the least.
Expert staffing and inputs
the personnel capacities of the energy ministries and re-
lated offices reflect the larger challenges of institutional 
reform in Serbia and Kosovo. Each, not surprisingly, could 
use more human and material resources, but in addition 
to this, the need for expert staffing and inputs stands 
out. political considerations in the selection of ministry 
and related office personnel in the energy field is inevita-
ble, but beyond political appointees, having a reserve of 
technical expertise is crucial for developing realistic and 
sound energy policies. Having this expert group at the 
disposal of policy makers has been challenging in both 
Serbia and Kosovo.
in Serbia, historically professional associations of engi-
neers have played an important role in stabilizing trends 
in the energy industry and setting high technical stan-
dards46. these trends are still an important characteristic 
of Serbia’s energy sector, but the actual mechanisms for 
this energy expertise consultation are currently missing 
from the Serbian energy policy scene. informal consulta-
tions inevitably are taking place as specific policies are 
being crafted, but few ways of formally and systemati-
cally engage these experts have been put in place. the 
result is a set of energy policies that do not necessarily 
reflect the most current scientific understandings of the 
experts and that have not benefitted from the experts’ 
potential professional collaborations with other Euro-
pean experts.
in Kosovo, the situation is slightly more complicated. 
professional associations of experts also were historically 
part of the consultation process, but the more pressing 
problem in Kosovo is the ability to train and retain min-
istry-related personnel who have the administrative ex-
pertise or potential to oversee institution building over-
all and in this case the energy reform process. in Kosovo’s 
case this deficit has been filled by short-term internation-
al experts brought in to assess and design various policy 
reforms. Yet, the valuable role of internationals expert 
cannot fully compensate for the local knowledge and set 
of policy priorities that form components of overall policy 
design. accordingly, implementation has been less suc-
cessful than anticipated as energy reform has even less 
domestic ownership of crafted policies than other areas. 
a capacity-building program for overall administration in 
Kosovo was set up two years ago to address this issue, in-
cluding the overall process of European integration, but 
progress is slow47.
Public participation
unfortunately, an informed public is often seen as a 
threat by the harried public administrations in Kosovo 
and Serbia. in the case of energy policy and its many 
versions, interests, and formulations, presenting digest-
ible and realistic information to the public is not easy. 
Yet public awareness of energy policy is essential both 
as part of legal commitments to abide by the aarhus 
Convention to ensure proper public consultation and for 
the simple reason that national strategies are likely to be 
somewhat economically painful and therefore in need of 
public backing. 
the public costs of the currently available energy poli-
cies are potentially far beyond what domestic Gdp 
and competitiveness can sustain. accordingly, finding 
consensus on acceptable trade-offs in both Serbia and 
Kosovo means that enhanced engagement of the public 
is essential.
Both administrations have created more public space 
for debate on energy reform than in previous times. En-
ergy policy documents are available and public debate 
has taken place on such decisions as building Kosovo C, 
for instance, but meaningful access to the larger energy 
policy discussions remains limited; most formulation 
and decision on energy policies still take place behind 
the closed doors of the government offices rather than 
through mechanisms that engage either the civil society 
or the larger public.
recommendations
to the governments of serbia and Kosovo:
Establish systematic review process for national  »
energy policies: this systematic review should 
be conducted on an annual basis and provide 
mechanisms for updating energy policy based on 
new data, governmental agreements and priori-
ties, technological innovations, and should reflect 
changes in the wider European energy environ-
ment.
Re-envision energy policies through 2020: »  plan-
ning now how to tackle the challenges of meet-
ing 2020 European union requirements for en-
ergy production and environmental controls will 
provide a more realistic set of short and medium 
term objectives for each government.
Introduce public awareness campaigns in Koso- »
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vo and Serbia to foster awareness about various 
aspects of the energy sector from energy secu-
rity, appropriate policy and coordination between 
various policies (housing, urban planning, foreign 
trade, energy, poverty reduction, fiscal and oth-
ers) to more technical aspects such as infrastruc-
ture planning, technical standards, labeling sys-
tems etc.
In order to better coordinate energy policy reform and im-
plementation:
Develop a coordination mechanism among min- »
istries and government bodies critical to overall 
energy policy: Coordinating the energy policy 
with other relevant ministries is critical for mini-
mizing contradictions and gaps in overall energy 
policy strategies. this could take the form of an 
intra-governmental working group and/or a set 
of liaison staff in the relevant government bodies 
tasked with keeping abreast of developments in 
and coordinating with the respective ministries. 
proper inclusion of and information sharing with 
the respective offices or ministries of European in-
tegration as well as the inclusion of parliament for 
proper oversight should be a key component of 
this coordination mechanism.
To enhance the domestic process of energy policy creation 
and implementation:
Increase inclusion of civil society in the energy  »
policy process: the governments should develop 
further mechanisms for practically including civil 
society representatives, both of expert groups and 
those concerned with governance issues. Many in 
civil society are not prepared for such engage-
ment without further skill building, but design-
ing a process that will bring together professional 
associations as well as environmental nGos and 
organizations focused on public policy and wider 
public goods would be a good first step in build-
ing a civil society component for coordination of 
larger energy policy.
In order to better coordinate and envision regional energy 
solutions:
Utilize established regional forums for strategizing  »
on regional energy security solutions: the Stabil-
ity pact for South Eastern Europe and subsequent 
fora related to the Energy Community treaty and 
Eu initiatives have provided a base for enhanced 
energy cooperation on a regional basis. the gov-
ernments should take full benefit of these in order 
to further concretize specific energy policy strat-
egies to ensure that government-to-government 
coordination is as high as possible.
Create a regional networking of professional  »
energy association groups: the use of domestic 
energy experts in the designing of energy policy 
has assisted the respective governments, but pro-
fessional networking of these associations has 
lapsed in the past decades. providing the basis 
for such networks to reconnect on a regional and 
European level will both invigorate national- level 
energy policies as well as provide an additional set 
of expertise for envisioning and planning regional 
energy security issues.
to the European Union and International community: 
Dedicate more resources to the governance of  »
energy-related reforms: the European union has 
committed substantial funds to Serbia and Koso-
vo to assist the governments in reaching their en-
ergy reform commitments. Making more resourc-
es available, particularly focused on assistance to 
professional associations, educational institutions 
related to energy issues, and assistance with es-
tablishing access to relevant databases and best 
practice information would allow the energy re-
form process and creation of the regional market 
to be more effective these should take the form of 
a) institutional assistance as well as mechanisms 
which would encourage a b) heightened civic 
dialogue for promoting European integration (in 
this case related to energy standards) by domestic 
civil society organizations.
Facilitate more transfers of expertise and experi- »
ence, best practice and professional conduct: in 
order to realize European 2020 visions and take 
advantage of the most updated trends in the 
energy field, enhanced networking of experts 
and their professional organizations from Serbia, 
Kosovo, and the region with their colleagues and 
respective organizations in the European union 
should be made a priority and facilitated. to some 
degree this has taken place within such programs 
as CardS, but there is a dearth of two-way com-
munication between donor community experts 
and domestic experts which would allow for more 
collegial cooperation and input into the larger Eu-
ropean energy policy and ownership of the deci-
sions related to best practices, professional con-
duct, and overall European energy security
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Melding environmental and energy policies creates its 
own type of new hybrid energy policy. Serbia and Koso-
vo have taken on the task of aligning energy policies with 
the latest Eu and international standards of environmen-
tal protection. Most attention to date has focused on get-
ting the legal frameworks in place that will oblige the re-
spective governments to enact the necessary legislation, 
action plans, and creation of institutions for carrying out 
international environmental obligations. 
on paper these laws look impressive; many of the envi-
ronmental obligations set out in the Southeast Europe 
(SEE) Energy Community treaty have already been devel-
oped or passed into law. But in reality, most of the legisla-
tion and subsequent bylaws have yet to be truly tested. 
Horizontal compliance to environmental standards is a 
key area for further work. institutions for environmental 
protection are new and suffer from low capacities that 
only time and political prioritization will remedy. 
actual levels of energy-related pollution remain an un-
known in both Serbia and Kosovo. developing or simply 
improving monitoring and data collection systems will 
be critical for any meaningful follow-through in envi-
ronmental monitoring and reinforcement. the legal ‘li-
ability to polluters’ legislation in place in both Serbia and 
Kosovo also distorts the actual costs of energy-related 
production and reform decisions. increasing attention to 
calculating the costs and alternatives to achieve energy 
security will not only become more accurate, it will lead 
to more open methods of engagement with the publics 
served.
actual articulation of how to make energy policy more 
secure and Green has started in both communities, but 
the process of ensuring that energy policy will be trans-
parent is not guaranteed. aarhus Convention principles 
on transparency and inclusion of public participation 
are only enforced for some aspects of policy making in 
the energy sector. and few, if any, of the environmental 
strategies have devoted much attention to the regional 
dimensions of their environmental impacts, despite in-
ternational legal obligations to do so.
additional attention and assistance from European 
and international colleagues can improve Serbia and 
Kosovo’s current report cards on greening their energy 
policies. But only domestically led initiatives will have 
the legitimacy and the insight of how to best address the 
greening of energy and to develop energy security. Key 
recommendations include:
to the governments of Serbia and Kosovo: 
Harmonize environmental legislation with ener- »
gy legislation.  Beyond the development of spe-
cific environmental legislation, each government 
needs to ensure that environmental legislation 
corresponds to and can be embedded with other 
energy-related legislation and institutions.
Keep the process in line with aarhus criteria. ini- »
tiate a process of public dialogue based on the 
suggestions and recommendations of the aarhus 
Convention for informing citizens about the op-
portunities, challenges, problems, and environ-
mental and social limitations of new energy ca-
pacity.
reform the legal liability to polluters. Legal liabil- »
ity legislation should be modified to reflect the 
principle of ‘polluter pays’ in order to encourage 
the prevention of environmental impacts and en-
sure rightful compensation to damaged parties. 
to the European union and international community:
amend SEE Energy Community treaty to include  »
environmental liability. Within the scope of the 
SEE Energy Community treaty, member countries 
and the European Commission should consider 
amending the treaty with an obligation to imple-
ment EC directive no 35/2004 on environmen-
tal liability, EC no 1407/2002 on state aid to the 
coal industry, CLrtap convention on air pollution 
along with all its protocols, an explicit require-
ment to accede to the Energy Charter treaty and 
the Eiti compact, as well as the Lugano Conven-
tion and the Convention on the protection of the 
Environment through Criminal Law. 
methodology and Background
Greening of energy policies is both a trend and obliga-
tion of European states. Even as adherence to strict/chal-
lenging environmental targets continues to stir strong 
debates within European union countries, governments 
in southeastern Europe are setting similar targets in an-
ticipation of eventual Eu membership. Yet, even with 
these stated objectives, political attention has only re-
cently turned to the greening of energy policies. Less 
mentioned, but still prevalent, is a common attitude that 
high environmental standards are a luxury for countries 
in transition that are attempting to achieve energy secu-
rity.
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Energy reform is a complex set of processes which often 
contain contradictory sub-themes and goals. Beyond 
setting goals for the legal and policy stage, attempts 
to improve domestic production and efficiency can ad-
versely affect overall costs as well as change the regional 
energy balance. increased energy security and efficiency 
have traditionally resulted in decreased energy environ-
mentalism. Such zero-sum policy making, however, is no 
longer affordable as a growing understanding of envi-
ronmental costs are figured into current energy policy 
decisions.
Winters in Belgrade and pristina most clearly prove this 
point. Heavy lead-filled air is the reality for the popu-
lation of Belgrade, even as residents in both cities and 
around Serbia and Kosovo worry that winter will outlast 
either their budgets or personal stashes of wood and 
other heating materials. this type of short-term thinking 
is reflected in the official policy circles, as well. policies 
to get through one more winter season - or even better, 
to pass off responsibility to another ministry or agency 
- have been the modus operandi. 
But, both residents and officials know that they can do 
better. the establishment of a new ministry for the envi-
ronment in Serbia in 2007 and Kosovo’s enhanced focus 
on environmental considerations in its strategic plan-
ning for its Kosovo C power plant suggests that environ-
mental concerns can and should play a significant role 
in energy policy reform. achieving such competency on 
the official level will take time and political will. it will also 
require willingness to include experts and assist citizens 
to engage in and take ownership of a process that will 
not only fuel their furnaces, but allow them to develop 
an energy security for all seasons that integrates with the 
efforts of their European neighbors. 
Where we are now and where we want to go
the dual costs of polluting: high environmental 
costs and inefficient use of energy 
the governments in both Serbia and Kosovo pledged a 
commitment to cleaner energy. Yet environmental costs 
have often not figured high on the policy agendas of Ser-
bia or Kosovo, partly because of the challenge in design-
ing ways to both improve energy security and protect 
the environment. 
Both Serbia and Kosovo use high amounts of relatively 
low quality domestic lignite for their energy production. 
as a result, both the environment and energy efficiency 
have suffered. Efforts to diversify energy sources and 
production methods are underway, but environmental 
concerns are often overridden by immediate economic 
and political considerations. 
However, a quick look at the admittedly sketchy set of 
numbers suggests that costs are likely higher than even 
environmental proponents would anticipate.
Energy intensity is exceptionally high in 
Serbia and worsens over time.
this third and final brief of the European Standards se-
ries by the European Movement in Serbia and KiprEd in 
Kosovo outlines some of the key environmental consid-
erations related to energy reform in Serbia and Kosovo, 
as well as the greater southeastern European region. 
Environmental issues are somewhat more tangible than 
other areas of energy policy, and it is hoped that this fo-
cus on environmental concerns will attract a larger share 
of the public to drive the debate on overall energy poli-
cies.
Top 5 energy polluters in Serbia:
TPP Obrenovac
TPP Kostolac
Petro-chemical complex in Pancevo
Refinery in Novi Sad
District heating in Kragujevac and Bor
Top 5 energy polluters in Kosovo:
Thermal power plants (Kosovo A&B)
Open cast mines in Obliq
District heating systems in Pristina, Gja-
kova, Mitrovica
Ferrous nickel battery plant in Peja
By 2003, Serbia estimated that environmental damage 
cost between 5-15 percent of Gdp. Most of these costs 
were related to the energy sector. Beyond these calcu-
lated costs, energy use of fuel wood has been linked to 
deforestation and indoor pollution as well as soil erosion. 
in addition, about 15 percent of premature deaths from 
respiratory disease in the country can be attributed to 
the damage from these same emissions48.
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the most affected areas are the Belgrade metropolitan 
area, and the Vojvodina, Macva and Smederevo regions. 
at the same time, the most densely populated areas in 
Serbia are home to more than half of the population and 
host more than two-thirds of the country’s economic ac-
tivity. 
Similar to Serbia, the energy sector in Kosovo is one of 
the major polluters. one of the two main power plants, 
Kosovo a, has registered its average particle emission at 
40 times higher than the Eu standard. While Kosovo B, 
the other main power plant has emissions that are three 
times higher than the Eu standard, very limited plans are 
underway for refurbishment as the focus is on retirement 
of Kosovo a in the year 201049. approximately 65 percent 
of Kosovo’s population living in and around pristina are in 
what are considered to be polluted areas. although lig-
nite coal is the major source of energy (97 percent), and a 
main contributor to greenhouse gas (GHG), no accurate 
measurement of emissions exists related to air pollution.
Emissions from Kosovo’s power plants overall have a 
high concentration level of acidifying gases, dust, and 
coal ashes, but emissions go beyond affecting air qual-
ity. ; the entire area around the Kosovo Electric Company 
(KEK), for example, is polluted due to the lack of water 
treatment which affects both surface and ground water 
quality50.
despite such high environmental cost coming from ener-
gy production and use, efficient utilization of energy re-
mains low. in Serbia, energy usage does not correspond 
to actual energy outputs. Carbon outputs, for example, 
were several times the oECd average, but without the 
equivalent energy outputs51. 
in Kosovo, high energy intensity is also the case for both 
industrial and domestic use, but again with a low level 
of energy output (reaching only 22 percent of the oECd 
country average).
Energy and environmental priorities
Both Serbia and Kosovo must balance their efforts to mit-
igate current and past polluting agents with preventive 
measures for the future. at the same time, a stable-if not 
improved-amount of energy must be generated.
 
For example, Kosovo has established the following short-
term priorities52: 1) program for reduction of the emission 
of nox and ash in both units of the Kosovo B power plant; 
2) a project for removal and reuse of existing ash landfills 
from the power plants, including the filling of craters cre-
ated during open mining of lignite; 3) establishment of 
a system for long-term planning that will influence the 
rational use of space with the strategic aim of harmoniza-
tion of development objectives and the need for protec-
tion of environmental balance53. 
No measurements exist to assess actual air 
pollution levels in Kosovo.
in Serbia, the most urgent attention has been focused on 
decreasing air pollution by: 1) replacing and/or upgrad-
ing the air cleaners/filters in the thermal power plants; 2) 
improving ash disposal techniques used at the thermal 
power plants; 3) closing city boiler stations and replacing 
them with more sustainable heating options.
But even these prioritized areas will take time to show 
results. in the case of emission reduction for Kosovo B, 
the first portion of regulations are intended to be imple-
mented during 2008 with the second unit of the plant to 
be compliant with lower Eu standards by 2016.
in Serbia, the stated objectives are already partially met, 
but as long as contributing factors like the majority of 
non-passenger vehicles in urban areas are over 15 years 
old and using leaded gasoline, air pollution will not im-
prove significantly54. 
Environmental Legal obligations
What has been agreed 
Serbia and Kosovo continue their efforts to align them-
selves with Eu environmental standards and legisla-
tion related to energy policy. as was briefly outlined in 
the first brief on legal standards, both have signed and 
ratified the Southeast Europe Energy Community treaty 
which provides clear steps on the obligations each must 
take to fulfill the principles of the treaty. this includes the 
subsequent acceptance of principles related to: improv-
ing the environmental situation in relation to the energy 
network grid and related energy efficiency; fostering the 
use of renewable energy; and, setting out the conditions 
for energy trade in the single regulatory space55.
the treaty extends some components of the “acquis com-
munautaire on energy”56 to southeastern Europe as well 
as addressing the acquis communautaire on environ-
ment”. this includes both acceding to and implement-
ing the Kyoto protocol as well as enforcing the related 
European Community directive (EC no 1996/96/61) con-
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cerning integrated pollution prevention and control, in-
cluding assurances that, “the construction and operation 
of new generating plants shall comply with the acquis 
communautaire on environment”57.
in terms of process, the expectation is that energy policy 
development and implementation will apply the prin-
ciples of the aarhus Convention which outlines mecha-
nisms to ensure transparency and public participation in 
the planning process. 
Encourage the development of civil society orga- »
nizations (financially and otherwise), notably by 
adopting the law on associations, and legislation 
on the legal status of foreign nGos.
adopt and implement a long-term strategy for an  »
environmentally sustainable energy policy.
What has been done
Both governments have needed time to take on this 
admittedly challenging list of legal obligations related 
to environmental protection. Legislative efforts started 
in Serbia in 1996 while in Kosovo they began in 2004. 
Generally speaking, all legislation that has been put in 
place in recent years has complied with international ob-
ligations. But, due to Kosovo’s undefined political status 
(at the time of this writing) there are limitations for its 
practical implementation of the Kyoto protocol59. Serbia, 
on the other hand, has been a signatory to international 
conventions, such as CLrtap, but has still not ratified sev-
en of its protocols60.
However, even considering the legislation, institutions, 
and structures already in place, effective implementation 
has been hindered by missing corresponding implemen-
tation legislation, low institutional capacities to carry out 
and enforce the legislation, a general legal framework 
that prioritizes ‘public good’ over potential polluters, and 
insufficient attention to making the policy process trans-
parent and representative of a regional dimension.
Serbia and Kosovo report card on inter-
national compliance:
Key environmental legislation
Meets SEE Community Energy Treaty
Meets EU acquis requirements
Ratifies or follows Kyoto*
Ratifies or follows Aarhus Convention 
procedures * (only partly)
Applies Thessaloniki Agenda (only partly)
*Due to Kosovo’s previously undetermined 
status, it could not ratify the above con-
ventions.
Finally, in addition to the SEE Energy Community treaty, 
the Eu established the thessaloniki agenda that identi-
fied ways and means of intensifying the Stabilization and 
association process (Saa) with the Western Balkan coun-
tries58. a number of the agenda’s ten provisions focus 
specifically on the environment: 
Continue to implement legislation on environ- »
mental impact assessment. ratify and start imple-
mentation of the Kyoto protocol. Ensure a viable 
financial framework for the implementation of a 
mid to long-term environmental protection pol-
icy. 
adopt and start implementing strategies on air  »
pollution, waste management and nature pro-
tection. Continue implementing the national en-
vironmental protection strategy, and the water 
strategy. Continue strengthening administrative 
capacity of environmental institutions and bod-
ies. Begin implementing the multi-annual plan for 
financing investment. Finalize construction of a 
facility for the treatment and safe disposal of haz-
ardous waste.
General goals for mitigating pollution in 
the energy production sectors in Kosovo 
and Serbia:
Reduction of emissions in air, water and •	
soil, and applying remediation programs.
Increase of energy efficiency in genera-•	
tion, supply, and consumption.
Use of extraction and production meth-•	
ods that will enable sustainable use of 
natural resources. 
Application of environmentally-friendly •	
technologies for production and use of 
‘clean coal’ technology.
Establishment of a monitoring system •	
and a computerized database.
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Environmental legislation related to the 
energy field 
Looking at a general checklist, both Kosovo and Serbia 
have managed to pass numerous pieces of legislation 
that fit Eu standards on the environment. However a 
number of pieces of legislation are still missing which 
has slowed down the overall harmonization of environ-
mental legislation into energy policy. 
in Kosovo, since the outset of the provisional institutions 
of Self Governance (piSG), all legislation related to the 
environment and energy has met European environ-
mental legislation standards, and those in the process 
of development adhere to acquis criteria61. For example, 
adoption of the Law on air protection in november 2004 
brought air quality legislation up to European standards. 
the enactment of the Kosovo Water Law in october 2004 
was considered a step forward to approximate Eu legis-
lation on water quality62. in addition, Eu road Maps have 
been developed for both electricity and gas. Both are 
being implemented in a timely manner according to the 
strategy in place. 
development of the Energy Efficiency and renewable 
Energy programme for 2007-2009 has reached the imple-
mentation stage and is on schedule. the action plan of 
the acquis on renewables has not only been developed, 
but is under implementation. However, other related 
areas of legislation (such as energy efficiency), have not 
been completed.
in Serbia, formal harmonization with the Eu acquis re-
lated to environmental issues has produced 130 regu-
lations and changes in the legal framework. this has 
included directives on everything from water supply in-
frastructure to legislation on industrial pollution and risk 
management. Legal frameworks for such critical areas 
as energy efficiency and renewable energy have still not 
been developed.
Environmental institutions and structures
irrespective of the multitude of legislation, real change 
has occurred more slowly. this is partly due to the need 
for developing the relevant institutional structures to 
carry out the legislation. Serbia established a separate 
Ministry of Environment out from under the Ministry 
of Science and research only in 2007. not surprisingly, 
it remains understaffed and its overall operational and 
administrative oversight capacities need to be strength-
ened.
Kosovo has had a separate Ministry for Environment and 
Spatial planning (MESp) a few more years, but specific 
agencies and/or directorates within the ministry are ei-
ther still not formed or operating at low capacities. For 
example, Kosovo has an environmental impact depart-
ment within the MESp tasked with preparing an environ-
mental impact assessment plan. Yet, it is still missing an 
Environmental protection agency and an Environmental 
inspectorate that would allow evaluation and verifica-
tion of implemented environmental policies. in Serbia, 
the Environmental protection agency has continued its 
mandate under the new ministry and has focused par-
ticularly on data collection and cooperation with the Eu-
ropean Environmental agency. But it still lacks capacity 
in fully implementing its integrated monitoring strategy, 
not to mention effective inspection and prosecutorial 
follow up of violations.
Embedding environmental legislation in 
energy institutions
Kosovo has passed a national Environmental Strategies 
(nES) in July 2004, and Serbia has a draft nES in parlia-
mentary procedure, but the enactment of these action 
plans cutting across multiple policy fields, particularly 
energy policy, is either in its very early stages or has re-
sulted in little practical progress. particularly critical in 
the institutional development is the ability to embed en-
vironmental objectives of each national Environmental 
Strategy within the energy-related institutions that most 
affect the environment and to enact the necessary regu-
lations and bylaws. 
Building up such a legal culture takes strong executive 
involvement, as well as time, and neither Kosovo nor Ser-
bia has had the time or political climate to embed such 
practices in their respective institutions.  in the case of 
Kosovo, the action plan is one of the first examples of a 
multi-ministerial approach to set Kosovo’s environmen-
tal priorities domestically, rather than by following the 
lead of international experts63. Key energy institutions, 
like MEM and KEK have worked together with the MESp 
to finalize the action plan and institutionalize environ-
mental concerns as part of their specific obligations in 
strategic planning for their respective institutions. in Ser-
bia, the national Environmental Strategy process also is 
being primarily led by domestic experts and as part of a 
consultative process with key energy institutions. How-
ever as the process began more recently, energy-related 
institutions and their strategies have, as yet, displayed 
few intensified environmental components.
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corresponding legislation and action plans
Setting up relevant institutions to match legislative man-
dates, however, is only part of the challenge. Many of the 
institutional structures that have been set up lack the 
legislative framework to adopt strategies and implemen-
tation plans. Without these, the efforts look good on pa-
per, but there is little that can be done to carry out their 
institutional mandates. 
overall, each institution is dependent on the ability of 
national Environmental plans to provide guidance for 
related policies and strategies. in Serbia’s case, the lack 
of coordination between national plans / policies has 
hindered development and implementation of specific 
plans. in Kosovo, the national plan is a bit farther along 
and in the implementation stage, but topic-specific plans 
are still primarily in the development stage.
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For example, Serbia’s specific directorates for water, for-
ests, etc., within the Ministry of Environment will have to 
implement regulations to comply with the larger legal 
framework. in Kosovo, the situation is similar: the Min-
istry of Mining (MEM) which oversees the majority of 
energy-related production activities will need to put in 
place specific regulations to both mitigate past damage 
while preventing future pollution64.
 
Legal “liability” to polluters 
Finally, from the legal point of view, enforcement of es-
tablished regulations will remain weak as long as the 
general legal frameworks in Serbia and Kosovo do not 
modify their understanding of ‘legal liability’ in relation 
to the environment. to date, issues of liability have been 
tightly connected to the concept of ‘public good.’ But in 
both Serbia and Kosovo, public good is understood to 
mean government-owned and/or managed, rather than 
as pro bono publico (for the benefit of the public) or to 
treat natural resources as commonly shared and owned 
by the public.
accordingly in terms of environmental controls and or 
damage, the principle that ‘polluter pays’ is replaced by 
the principle that the ‘polluter pays rent/taxes/fees’ to use 
specific mineral and natural resources, based on a bilat-
eral relationship between public authorities and polluter 
rather than one in which the authorities strive to repre-
sent the best interests of the public, possibly through pu-
nitive damage payments for environmental impacts. 
this has an effect on calculating the real cost of energy 
production and of pollution, as well as an impact on the 
propensity to be proactive and preventive in counter-
ing negative environmental impacts. For example, in 
2001 the national company, oil industry of Serbia, was 
granted monopoly status in exchange for control of en-
ergy prices and excessive taxation. at the same time, this 
relieved the company of the responsibility for actual en-
vironmental impact or the financial capacity to take on 
effective prevention or cleanup actions. this tendency is 
compounded further by the less-than-consistent ability 
to have public oversight and public participation in pro-
cesses concerning the public good.  
While the legal understanding of public good in Kosovo 
is similar, the process of legislating public oversight has 
had more time to develop. the publication and public 
viewing period of 30 days for an Environmental impact 
assessment (Eia) for every governmental policy that 
has environmental impacts has increased public debate 
within Kosovo on the true costs of energy production. 
But as the debate on the building of the Kosovo C power 
plant has demonstrated, in the end, administrative au-
thority to define and determine the ‘best interests of the 
public’ still makes the process one that prioritizes the re-
lationship of government and (potential) polluter over 
the general population.
transparency of the process
Both Serbia and Kosovo have been attempting to apply 
aarhus Convention principles to their energy policy re-
form. Generally speaking, the aarhus requirements on ac-
cess to environmental information, public participation, 
and access to justice on environmental issues have been 
incorporated into the new and developing legislation in 
relation to planning, but not necessarily in relation to the 
strategic plans of the respective ministries. For example, 
in Serbia’s case, prevailing laws related to privatization, 
mining and / or energy do not contain provisions to en-
sure transparency of extractive industries investments or 
undertakings (as the Eiti compact requires). the Law on 
Concessions contains provisions on transparency of the 
process, public tendering and selection of the conces-
sionaire. However, the final result of the procedure—i.e., 
eventual award of the concession contract—is not nec-
essarily available in the public domain. the strong inter-
national presence in Kosovo and management of priva-
tizations through the Kosovo trust agency (Kta) has 
ensured some level of transparency, but the confusion 
over the status of energy providers and, until now, lack of 
a law on concessions has muddled the process of public 
access and transparency. 
For those areas where aarhus already has been applied, 
independent observers have noted that both govern-
ments have improved their access to information and the 
transparency of some of the processes. But overall, the 
policy processes allow engagement more ‘ex post facto’ 
than during the procedure, particularly if comparing 
central governmental performance with performance at 
the local level. 
However, even when the law prescribes access to the 
available information, critical information is not always 
gathered or processed by the competent authorities due 
to a lack of collection mechanisms. For example, the lat-
est systematic sampling on soil quality in Serbia dates 
from 1996. and little, if any, data on air, water, or soil lev-
els of pollution in Kosovo diminishes any meaningful en-
gagement that the public could have on understanding 




Legal obligations for signatories of the SEE Energy Com-
munity treaty focus not only on domestic, but also re-
gional provisions for cleaner energy. Both Serbia and 
Kosovo have accepted these responsibilities, but have 
been slower to set up the regional framework necessary 
to facilitate regional cooperation. Both have continued 
to be active participants in the work of the regional 
Environmental Construction programme (rerep), but 
increased mechanisms for engagement need to be put 
in place, particularly when considering the interdepen-
dence the governments have not only concerning ener-
gy policy, but on environmental policy and its impacts. 
 
For example, the Sava and danube rivers in Serbia are 
recipients of water from the largest Serbian lignite-fired 
power plants and ash disposals. these deposits – togeth-
er with likely similar energy-related pollution coming 
from the larger danube catchment areas that includes 
(amongst others) Kosovo, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and 
Montenegro – have both regional sources and regional 
environmental impacts. 
in Kosovo, for example, the law on transportation of haz-
ardous materials was passed in 2004, but it is unclear to 
what extent this law and its implementation is coordi-
nated with corresponding laws in Serbia and around the 
region in the transport of energy-related products.
Linking Environmental Legislation with 
Energy Priorities – How can we develop the 
economy, be energy secure, and be Green?
Getting legally compliant and functional in environmen-
tal and energy policies is not being done just for the sake 
of matching Eu standards. rather, harmonizing environ-
mental objectives with those of energy security can be 
mutually advantageous.
When reviewing the strategic plans of each of the govern-
ments, it is clear that energy efficiency is a key concern. 
part of the formula for tackling energy efficiency can be 
found in making energy cleaner. For example, in the case 
of Serbia, decreasing fuel wood consumption in the ma-
jority of households could decrease energy expenditures 
while also decreasing indoor air pollution. 
overall savings on energy production not only make 
for more efficient energy production and use, but also 
allow some of the cost savings to be used to fund envi-
ronmental prevention and cleanup programs. Given that 
budgets are tight for implementation of environmental 
policies and monitoring, not to mention prevention and 
cleanup, such additional resources could go a long way 
towards Kosovo and Serbia being able to afford clean en-
ergy policies. 
Priorities, capacities … results
a general lack of capacity within both governments is 
often cited as the main impediment to meaningful in-
clusion and implementation of environmental concerns 
in energy policy. this is not surprising given the general 
challenge of political and economic reforms. However, 
prioritized attention to several specific areas of concern 
could substantially impact the governments’ environ-
mental scorecards. these include: increased monitoring 
and reporting capacities; improved coordination capaci-
ties; and, increased resources for the institutions. 
Both Serbia and Kosovo suffer from poor to non-exist en-
vironmental monitoring, data collection, and reporting 
capacities. the fact that Kosovo has no reliable data on 
actual pollution levels or that the last soil samples taken 
in Serbia are from 1996 greatly impedes effective evalu-
ation and planning for mitigation of environmental im-
pacts. 
additionally, implementation of monitoring systems is 
only in the very early stages. Early assessments suggest 
that more human resources as well as financial ones 
need to be targeted at developing effective monitor-
ing and reporting systems and coordinating these with 
proper enforcement mechanisms. For example, training 
programs for inspectors in Serbia have taken place, but 
there is still a need for further strengthening of inspec-
tion capacity and to be able to link this with effective 
judiciary follow-up. Similarly, in Kosovo, monitoring and 
collection capacities are being developed in this area, 
but effective cooperation amongst inspectors and pros-
ecutorial bodies has not been tested.
Both governments clearly know that this is an area that 
needs to be addressed and include provisions in their en-
vironmental action plans, but resources to address the 
information gap have been slow to materialize. Serbia’s 
overall budget for environmental protection remains 
low at 0.4 percent of Gdp, and Kosovo’s is not known, but 
is likely to be just a very small part of Gdp. out of these 
budgets, only a fraction of needed resources is available 
for developing and carrying out monitoring and data 
collection systems. 
Strategic partnering with other European agencies can 
help overcome some of these gaps, as well as the antici-
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pated technical and financial assistance needed by both 
governments as they engage in the Eu accession process. 
However, clear political prioritization of environmental 
concerns must first be demonstrated domestically before 
external assistance can be realistically expected. as re-
cent rounds of Eu accession demonstrated, environmen-
tal priorities require significant financial commitments by 
accession countries. Slovenia, for example, invested uS$ 
2.7 billion dollars in this regard65. it is likely that Serbia 
and Kosovo, in order to prioritize, enable and strengthen 
environmental laws and institutions, will have to invest 
a similar amount in order to achieve a greener energy 
policy and sustainable energy security.
recommendations
to the governments of serbia and Kosovo:
Complete all necessary environmental legislation  »
related to the energy field. Many laws have been 
passed since the signing of the SEE treaty, but a 
number of pieces of legislation are missing (such 
as laws on energy efficiency) which each govern-
ment needs to prioritize.
Continue development of environmental institu- »
tions and structures. Each government now has 
a ministry of environment, but key correspond-
ing institutions (such as environmental protec-
tion agencies) still need to be created or staffed 
appropriately to allow proper implementation of 
environmental components.
Harmonize environmental legislation with en- »
ergy legislation. Beyond the development of spe-
cific environmental legislation, each government 
needs to ensure that environmental legislation 
corresponds to and can be embedded with other 
energy-related legislation and institutions. For ex-
ample in Serbia, drafting a Law on implementa-
tion of the SEE Energy Community treaty would 
specifically assign obligations to various compe-
tent authorities, establish coordination mecha-
nisms between them and set up an appropriate 
timeline for institutional, legal and factual adjust-
ments. 
Develop corresponding legislation and ac- »
tion plans. Follow-through is everything. in 
the case of environmental legislation, each 
government must ensure that it has devel-
oped the necessary central and ministry-level 
action plans and procedural bylaws to allow 
environmental legislation to be carried out. 
 
Keep the process in line with Aarhus criteria. »  ini-
tiate a process of public dialogue based on the 
suggestions and recommendations of the aar-
hus Convention for informing citizens about the 
opportunities, challenges, problems, and envi-
ronmental and social limitations of new energy 
capacity. Specifically it is recommended that pub-
lic discussion, consideration of alternatives and 
availability of environmental information (based 
on independent monitoring and data collection) 
should become the prerequisite for public sup-
port to any infrastructure project. in particular, the 
public needs access to information concerning 
funding, granting a concession, and entering into 
any kind of obligation, including bilateral treaties. 
in addition, environmental impact assessments 
should become obligatory for privatization pro-
cedures related to companies or facilities that are 
environmentally sensitive. in other words, priva-
tization should be considered as restructuring of 
a public asset in terms of the Environmental Law 
and would require public participation and an Eia 
before a final decision can be made.
Reform the legal liability related to pollution.  »
Legal liability legislation should be modified to 
reflect the ‘polluter pays’ principle in order to al-
low for the prevention of environmental impacts 
and ensure compensation for eventual damage 
to rightful parties. Collection of rent/taxes/fees 
should be abandoned and replaced with more ef-
fective regulatory mechanisms. Government and 
regulatory authorities should refrain from con-
trolling prices charged by public companies (for 
services and commodities) without taking into 
consideration full environmental costs. 
Increase focus on the regional dimension. »  Each of 
the governments has made clear regional com-
mitments to environmental protection in relation 
to energy security; yet few, if any, of the current 
legislation addresses the regional issues. addi-
tional attention is needed to build up the legal 
frameworks that will be necessary for proper re-
gional consultation, cooperation, and implemen-
tation of environmental protection procedures.
Allocate greater share of resources from central  »
budgets to environmental protection. despite 
tight general budgets, Serbia and Kosovo need to 
make the environment a priority in their spend-
ing strategies. achievement of Eu standards in 
the environmental sector will require substantial 
financial resources, some provided by the Eu, but 
most dependent on domestic expenditures. 
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to the European Union and International community:
Amend SEE Energy Community Treaty to include  »
environmental liability. Within the scope of the 
SEE Energy Community treaty, member countries 
and the European Commission could consider an 
amendment that obligates the implementation of 
the following elements: EC directive no 2004/35 
on environmental liability; EC regulation no 
2002/1407 on state aid to the coal industry; CLr-
tap Convention with all its protocols; explicit re-
quirement to accede to the Energy Charter treaty 
and the Eiti compact, as well as, the Lugano Con-
vention and the Convention on the protection of 
the Environment through Criminal Law.
Add regulatory benchmarking to regional require- »
ments. Benchmarking of regulatory performance 
could be considered within the scope of the SEE 
Energy Community treaty in order to ensure that 
each government follows-through and can track 
results in implementing its environmental action 
plan.
Increase technical and financial resources avail- »
able to achieve environmental objectives. Each 
government receives some level of assistance 
from the Eu as it embarks on greening its energy 
reform. However, most mechanisms for Eu as-
sistance are linked to specific accession criteria. 
although neither Serbia nor Kosovo has formally 
started this process, their legislation already is 
geared towards achieving Eu standards. accord-
ingly, considering additional funding while in the 
Saa process, or its equivalent, could quicken the 




Serbia energy intensity is high for modern European standards. almost half of primary energy requirements are sup-
plied by domestic lignite, about one quarter by crude oil, a bit more than 10% by natural gas, about 10% by fuel wood, 
and about 7% by renewable energy sources including hydro energy.
at the moment, Serbia import dependency is moderate: the country imports about 30% of its total energy demand. 
However, import of crude oil and natural gas amount to 85% of liquid fuels and natural gas demand respectively. 
Beyond that, most of heavy machinery and critical technologies in power plants, refineries and lignite mines are 
imported and heavily dependent on imported spare parts for regular maintenance. if the country is going to com-
ply with the Energy Community treaty environmental requirements and maintain or eventually, increase share of 
lignite in its energy mix, more imported technologies and equipment will be required. another option would be to 
decrease share in lignite in the national energy balance and to opt for higher energy efficiency, with a greater share 
of renewable energy, notable biomass and international competitiveness. in that case, import of natural gas and hard 
coal could increase both in volumes and relative terms while imported energy could easily cover 50% or more of the 
national energy demand.
Lignite extraction 
Lignite extraction is by far the largest industrial activity in Serbia. annual extraction of about 35 million tons of lig-
nite that required removal of more than 80 million tons of overburden from open pits and transport of material to 
overburden dumps and storages near power plants is the largest solid material throughput in the country. it exceeds 
entire input, output and transportation including transits in the rest of Serbia industry and agriculture. 
When calculated per extracted volumes, productivity of lignite mines is below unit productivity in similar mines in 
Eastern Germany, for example, even though machinery is similar. taking into account size of lignite extraction op-
eration in comparison with the size of economy (or industry) its internationally comparable productivity per unit of 
useful energy creates a competitive disadvantage that is difficult to overcome even if all other sectors could perform 
better than the European average productivity. 
Wood
Fuel wood is the most important fuel for space heating66 in the country. about 60% of households67 use fuel wood as 
the main source of heat for space heating and cooking. total annual consumption mounts up to 12 million cubic me-
ters of stacked wood. its growing, harvesting and use are generally inefficient. about quarter of households maintain 
their own small woods with only purpose to ensure supply of fuel wood for the household.
renewable energy
Hydropower is the only renewable energy source widely used for energy production accounting for 7 % of total pri-
mary energy supply and 30 % of the electricity generation. the remaining unused and technical available hydro po-
tential could account for about 8.6% of final electricity consumption and is mostly located on the Morava river basin, 
the drina and Lim and the danube.
APPEnDIx A
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Kosovo energy market
Kosovo energy intensity is aligned in somewhat same areas as Serbia. With the difference when it comes to gas us-
age, which is nonexistent in Kosovo, two thirds of its energy requirements are fulfilled by lignite domestically mined, 
slightly less than one quarter are covered by oil and its derivates, wood is used in slightly less than 10 % while as hydro 
and other renewable sources such as solar energy cover barely a couple of percent of energy requirements. the poor 
state of the power plants after the conflict of 1999 required a high degree of maintenance in almost every part of the 
power plants (Both Kosovo a and B). Currently due to one of these maintenances taking place Kosovo is dependent in 
import. in periods when the plants are working normally Kosovo can fulfil its current need for electrical energy.
 
Lignite
Lignite extraction takes place at the open-cast coal mines of Bardh and Mirash and cover a working surface area of 
10 km2 and if all the external dump sites from 1956-1991 are included, the mine covers a total surface area of 11 
km2. Coal extraction has been developed in two coal mines, with a projected output target of 16.7 million tons of 
coal per year, not including the removal of 28 millions m3 of overburden. the coal is mined by using a rotor excava-
tor and transportation to the generating plants (Kosovo a and Kosovo B) is on conveyor belts. until the end of 1998, 
226,260,825 tons of coal had been mined in Kosovo, representing 1.58% of the estimated geological deposits and 
1.96% of the total exploitable reserves.
District heating systems
district heating system currently exists only in pristina, Gjakova and Mitrovica. these systems fulfill only 5% of the 
demand. Heating technology is based on mazut (heavy oil) and uses old technology with negative environmental 
impacts.
Gas and petroleum products
the plan to bring natural gas into Kosovo by the end of the 1980’s was never realized. only a few towns, via an old 
underground gas system, had access from Electroekonomia of Kosovo, but this system was heavily damaged. there is 
a relatively satisfactory market supply of petroleum products by private companies. However, even in this sector there 
are problems with securing mandatory reserves for a crisis situation.
Wood
the total annual demand for fuel wood in Kosovo is estimated to be 400,000 cubic meters per year, with an average 
high per capita consumption because rural households generally cook and heat with wood. due to unreliable elec-
tricity supply in cities, many urban households also heat with wood. Less than half the fuel wood demand is met from 
Kosovo’s forest resources, with the rest imported from Serbia and Montenegro. Many forested areas remain in a con-
stant state of degradation due to continual firewood harvesting. if forest management were rationalized, fuel wood 
production could be made more economically efficient and less environmentally damaging.
APPEnDIx A
snAPsHot of EnErGy mArKEts
39
Appendix B: 
interactions Chart of Serbian Energy Sector
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Appendix c
interactions Chart of Kosovo Energy Sector
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1 according to World Bank and European Commission 
reports, the region’s energy shortfall is set to grow dra-
matically in the medium term, making calls for a more 
cooperative and unified SE European energy market in-
creasingly compelling (World Bank and European Com-
mission, South East Europe Generation investment Study 
– Executive Summary, 2003).
2 Kosovo’s participation in the treaty as well as other in-
ternational and regional legal commitments has been 
conducted as Kosovo unMiK administered.
3 on behalf of Kosovo, unMiK signed the Energy Com-
munity of South East Europe (ECSEE). By doing so, Koso-
vo became an equal partner and player in establishing 
ECSEE. 
4 the full set of principles includes:
Create a stable regulatory and market framework •	
capable of attracting investment in gas networks, 
power generation, and transmission and distribu-
tion networks, so that all parties have access to 
a stable and continuous energy supply, which is 
essential for economic development and social 
stability;
Create a single regulatory space for trade in net-•	
work Energy that is necessary to match the geo-
graphic extent of the concerned product mar-
kets;
Enhance the security of supply of the single reg-•	
ulatory space by providing a stable investment 
climate in which connections to Caspian, north 
african, and Middle East gas reserves can be de-
veloped, and indigenous sources of energy such 
as natural gas, coal, and hydropower can be ex-
ploited;
improve the environmental situation in relation •	
to network Energy and related energy efficiency, 
foster the use of renewable energy, and set out 
the conditions for energy trade in the single regu-
latory space;
develop network Energy market competition on •	
a broader geographic scale and exploit econo-
mies of scale.
 
5 Convention on access to information, public participa-
tion in decision-Making and access to Justice in Environ-
mental Matters this convention was ratified on June 25, 
1998, in the danish city of aarhus, at the Fourth Ministe-
rial Conference, as part of the “Environment for Europe” 
process. the Convention entered into force on october 
30, 1998.
6 the treaty requires certain compliance related to envi-
ronmental standards, including the objective to accede 
to the Kyoto protocol to the unFCCC and the European 
Community directive 96/61/EC of the European Council 
of September 24, 1996, concerning integrated pollution 
prevention and control.
7
European Community directive 2003/54/EC of 1. 
the European parliament and of the Council of 
June 26, 2003, concerning common rules for the 
internal market in electricity; 
European Community directive 2003/55/EC of 2. 
the European parliament and of the Council of 
June 26, 2003, concerning common rules for the 
internal market in natural gas; 
European Community regulation 1228/2003/EC 3. 
of the European parliament and of the Council of 
June 26, 2003, on conditions for access to the net-
work for cross-border exchanges in electricity.
8 Components of the acquis communautaire on environ-
ment that are to be applied within domestic legislation 
are:
European Community Council directive 1985/337/1. 
EEC of June 27, 1985, on the assessment of the ef-
fects of certain public and private projects on the 
environment as amended by Council directive 
97/11/EC of March 3, 1997, and directive 2003/35/
EC of the European parliament and of the Council 
of May 26, 2003, from July 1, 2006;
European Community Council directive 1999/32/2. 
EC of april 26, 1999, relating to a reduction in the 
sulfur content of certain liquid fuels from decem-
ber 31, 2011;
European Community directive 2001/80/EC of the 3. 
European parliament and of the Council of octo-
ber 23, 2001, on the limitation of emissions of cer-
tain pollutants into the air from large combustion 
plants from december 31, 2017;
article 4(2) of European Community directive 4. 
79/409/EEC of the Council of april 2, 1979, on the 
conservation of wild birds from July 1, 2006.
9 these include:
all agreements between undertakings, decisions •	
by associations of undertakings, and concerted 
practices that have as their object or effect the 
prevention, restriction, or distortion of competi-
tion;
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abuse by one or more undertakings of a dominant •	
position in the market between the Contracting 
parties as a whole or in a substantial part thereof;
any public aid that distorts or threatens to distort •	
competition by favoring certain undertakings or 
certain energy resources.
10 the country shall take all appropriate measures to 
eliminate the incompatibilities established by rights and 
obligations arising from agreements concluded before 
signature of the treaty, starting from July 1, 2007. pub-
lic companies responsible for electricity and natural gas 
transmission are expected to establish available trans-
mission capacities in transparent procedure that could 
be challenged through public hearing within the frame-
work of the competent regulatory institution.
 
11 See Council decision 2004/520/EC of June 14, 2004, fol-
lowed by the Council decision 2006/56/EC of January 30, 
2006, as well as the thessaloniki agenda for the Western 
Balkans: Moving towards European integration, General 
affairs and External relations, 2518th Council Meeting, 
Luxemburg, June 16, 2003, declaration Eu – Western Bal-
kans Summit, thessaloniki, June 21, 2003, related to the 
energy sector.
12
Encourage the development of civil society or-1. 
ganizations financially and otherwise, notably by 
adopting the law on associations, and legislation 
on the legal status of foreign nGos.
Speed up the restructuring and privatization of 2. 
large socially owned and state-owned enterprises 
to strengthen financial and corporate discipline.
reform the system of regulated and administered 3. 
prices. in particular, further adjust energy prices 
towards cost recovery levels, also gradually re-
placing all existing price subsidies to poorer con-
sumers with direct transfers.
Continue approximating legislation to Eu legisla-4. 
tion and standards (air pollution, waste manage-
ment, and environment protection); adopt and 
begin implementing the national environment 
protection strategy. adopt and start implement-
ing a strategy for sustainable development. 
Strengthen administrative capacity, notably of 
institutions and bodies in charge of planning, 
permitting, inspecting, and monitoring, as well as 
project management. develop a multiyear plan 
for financing investment.
implement adopted legislation, notably on envi-5. 
ronmental assessments and industrial pollution.
Fully implement the Energy Law also ensuring a 6. 
smooth functioning of the independent Energy 
regulatory agency; continue environmental au-
dits on energy plants and address the worst pol-
luters. Ensure unbundling with a view to restruc-
turing and privatization. Strengthen the necessary 
administrative structures. Make further progress 
towards a regional energy market (including 
through improved interconnectivity).
Continue to implement legislation on environ-7. 
mental impact assessment. ratify and start imple-
mentation of the Kyoto protocol. Ensure a viable 
financial framework for the implementation of a 
mid to long-term environmental protection pol-
icy.
adopt and implement a long-term strategy for an 8. 
environmentally sustainable energy policy.
 
13 this is with the exception of provisions on eligible cus-
tomers that are to be applied from January 1, 2008, for all 
non-household customers and from January 1, 2015, for 
all customers. Serbian Energy Law empowers the regula-
tory agency to open the market as appropriate. the pro-
cess of registration of eligible customers for electricity 
and natural gas is already on the way. the Law has envis-
aged third party access to the energy networks.
Serbia was also obliged to provide the European Commis-
sion with a plan to implement the directives 2001/77/EC 
and 2003/30/EC of the European Community on renew-
able energy sources till July 1, 2007, and the develop-
ment plan to bring its network Energy sectors into line 
with Generally applicable Standards of the European 
Community within one year from the moment the list of 
such standards is adopted by the Ministerial Council of 
the treaty. 
14 For details, see Skopljak, Zoran, “the Competition Com-
mission: one Year on,” Quarterly Monitor no. 8, January 
– March 2007, CEVES, Belgrade, 2007.
15 among its duties include setting the conditions and cri-
teria for issuing licenses and permits to carry out energy 
activities and construct new generating capacity, regu-
lating network and public supply prices and approving 
tariffs, and customer protection.
16 these include the:
2004/8 Law on Energy - this law defines the ba-•	
sic principles for an energy strategy and energy 
programs in Kosovo; the rules for ensuring the ef-
ficient use of energy and the use of renewable en-
ergy sources; the rules for establishing an energy 
market; and other measures necessary to ensure 
43
the proper functioning of activities in the energy 
sector.
2004/9 Law on the Energy regulator - this law es-•	
tablishes an independent Energy regulatory of-
fice and defines the powers, duties, and functions 
of the Energy regulatory office; the conditions 
for issuing licenses to carry out energy activities; 
the procedures for granting permits for the con-
struction of new generating capacity; the criteria 
for regulating prices; and the conditions of energy 
supply.
2004/10 Law on Electricity - this Law establishes •	
the conditions for performing the generation, 
transmission, distribution, supply, trade, import, 
export, and transit of electricity; the organization 
of access to the networks; and the organization of 
the electricity market.
17 the following laws have been passed or are in the pro-
cess of review: Law on Construction; Law on Foreign 
investments (to be promulgated by SrSG); Law on pub-
lic procurement; Law on Concession procedures (to be 
promulgated by SrSG); Law on Expropriation (priority of 
opM for 2006 ); Law on Spatial planning ; and the Law on 
Environment protection (under revision).
18 these indicators are available for Serbia and Montene-
gro, but they should be considered indicative for Serbia, 
as the Montenegro energy system is comparably very 
small.
19 reserves of lignite, in particular, are considered suffi-
cient to provide Kosovo with energy for several hundred 
years. (EStap i, “Module G,” 2002, estimates reserves at 
around 14.3 billion tons; MEM, “Kosovo’s Mineral re-
sources,” 2005, estimates that by the start of 2006, 270 
million tons of lignite had been exploited, and around 
400 million m3 of ash stored.)
 
20 While MEM certainly bears a larger portion of the 
blame, the Ministry of Environment and Spatial planning 
(MESp) also has responsibility. it has been rather silent in 
the whole Kosovo C venture, though having the possibil-
ity of terminating any award given to the potential win-
ners of the bid for Kosovo C.  
21 the full management and control of the project was 
entrusted to the project Steering Committee, set up fol-
lowing a directive by the SrSG on March 17, 2006.
22 administrative instruction, prepared by MEM and cur-
rently in power: 
administrative instruction no. 2005/1 on “Energy •	
inspectorate,” adopted by the Minister of Energy 
and Mining, Ethem Çeku, on July 19, 2005.
administrative instruction no. 2005/2 on “on •	
rules determining the right of Construction or 
the Expansion of the Existing Energy Sites For the 
transmission and distribution of Electricity, Heat, 
or natural Gas on non-private Land,” adopted by 
the Minister of Energy and Mining, Ethem Çeku, 
on July 19, 2005.
administrative instruction no. 2005/3 on “rules •	
on right of Way and access to private Land: Crite-
ria and Condition for Compensation,” adopted by 
the Minister of Energy and Mining, Ethem Çeku, 
on July 19, 2005.
administrative instruction no. 2005/4 on “rules •	
on Energy Balance,” adopted by the Minister of 
Energy and Mining, Ethem Çeku, on July 19, 2005. 
u. a. nr, 2005/6 mbi “rules on restrictive Measures •	
on Energy Supply,” adopted on July 27, 2005, by 
prime Minster of Kosovo, Bajram Kosumi.
administrative instruction no. 2005/7 on “rules •	
and Security,” adopted on July 27, 2005, by prime 
Minster of Kosovo, Bajram Kosumi.
administrative instruction no. 01/2007 on “on •	
prescribing of the Conditions for determining 
Eligible Customers for the Year 2007,” adopted on 
January 25, 2007, by the Minister of Energy and 
Mining, Ethem Çeku. 
administrative instructions which derive from existing 
laws: 
administrative instruction on “authorization of •	
business entities for the processing of equipment 
under pressure and the authorization for filling of 
liquid gasbags, oil and technical gas.”
administrative instruction on “assignment of cri-•	
teria and measures for the refining process, for 
equipments under pressure.” 
administrative instruction on “Labeling electric •	
house appliances.” 
administrative instruction on “Energetic audit.”•	
Laws in power:
Law on Energy, no. 2004/8•	
Law on Electricity, no. 2004/10•	
Law on the Energy regulator, no. 2004/9•	
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proposed laws:
Law on Electricity Efficiency – this law proceeded •	
to the government and the assembly at the end 
of 2005 but was revoked by MEM after committee 
review stated that the draft law had budgetary 
implications.  
draft propositions for changes and supplements •	
to the Law on the Energy regulator are revoked 
by the Ministry from the assembly for further re-
view and analysis.  
Legislation deriving from the obligations set forth in the 
Energy Community treaty of Southeast Europe: 
Law on natural Gas is in the process of first draft •	
by the internal ministerial group. instructions for 
Energy Efficiency: “Labeling electric house appli-
ances” and “Energetic audit” are being prepared 
by inter-ministerial experts and are in their final 
phase.
20 all direct or indirect discrimination based on any 
grounds, particularly on race, sex, national origin, social 
origin, birth, religion, political or other opinion, property 
status, culture, language, age, mental or physical disabil-
ity shall be prohibited.
24 For example, an investor looking at the legislative 
framework today will be confused by regulations 2005/2 
(which does not recognize the Ministry of Energy and 
Mining) and 2005/3 (which makes only minor reference 
to the Ministry of Energy and Mining) that were issued 
by unMiK a month after the promulgation of regulation 
2004/50 transferring powers to the Ministry of Energy 
and Mining. 
 
25 article 87, Constitution of the republic of Serbia.
26  Korporata Energjetike e Kosovës. 
27  to illustrate this, in 2003 KEK lost about 43 percent of its 
generated electricity to technical and commercial losses 
that originated in outright theft through illegal connec-
tions and in indirect theft through meter tampering. of 
the remaining 57 percent of electricity that was billed, 
KEK was able to collect only 72 percent of the total. (Ko-
rporata Energjetike e Kosovës (KEK), Corporate issues, 
relevance of Current Measures [Swedish development 
advisors], January 2004).
28 the iMF Extended agreement stipulates that, “the 
restructuring of public utilities and other state-owned 
monopolies will combine hard budget constraint mea-
sures (subsidy cuts and strict wage controls) with mea-
sures that introduce competition. the public utilities 
will strengthen their collections by enforcing penalties 
on late payments and disconnecting users that are late 
on their obligations for more than two months. a prior 
action regarding the hiring of an international advisor 
for the privatization of the oil company was completed 
on time, and it was expected that international tenders 
would be launched in Q2 2006, but this process has been 
delayed.
29  in accordance with the Law on assets owned by the 
republic of Serbia, public companies operate the state-
owned assets, even if these assets appear on company 
balance sheets. State-owned assets could be sold only 
through public tender.
30  and some years before assignment of state assets to 
the national Saving Bank followed by simple privatiza-
tion of the Bank.
31 Given the prohibitive penalties for those who fail to 
comply with the protocol, Kosovo could face a very costly 
future. on the basis of a 16.8 million ton increase in car-
bon emissions—resulting from the closure of Kosovo a 
and opening of Kosovo C—together with an optimistic 
$5 per metric ton price for emissions credits purchased 
from carbon funds, etc., Kosovo could face an annual bill 
of over $84 million (www.Forumi2015.org – a Modern 
tale Kosovo—C 2100, Lignite power in Kosovo: limits of 
sustainability, april 2007).
32 tpES per unit of Gdp ratio in Serbia (1.65 toe / 000 2000 
uSd) was more than five times higher than the world av-
erage (0.32 toe / 000 2000 uSd) and eight times more 
than the oECd average (0.2 toe / 000 2000 uSd), iEa, Key 
World Energy Statistics, 2006.
33 power production of Kosovo a dropped from its peak 
production in 1978 when 3.391.411 MW was delivered to 
924,480 MW in 1999 and 582,264 MW in 2000.
34 the estimated lignite quantity is between 11.55 - 14 bil-
lion tons with most of this considered of good quality. 
Lignite reserves have a low content of sulfur and relative-
ly good concentration lime (calcium oxide) for partial sul-
fur absorption during burning. the proportion between 
the waste land and lignite is very favorable, a fact that 
makes mines very attractive for exploitation. However it 
should be kept in mind that a comparison of lignite with 
internationally tradable hard coal means that ‘low’ sulfur 
content in lignite is roughly equal in volume base to very 
high sulfur content of tradable hard coal, yielding the 
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same energy content and a few times smaller volume. 
35 in Kosovo the Ministry of Energy and Mining has de-
signed a strategy for the development of the energy sec-
tor for the period of 2005 to 2015. the Energy Strategy 
of Kosovo is drafted in full accordance with the Law on 
Energy and Kosovo Government program and it contains 
the fundamental framework based on which the objec-
tives and development priorities of energy sectors were 
developed.  and in Serbia, the programme of implemen-
tation of the Energy Source development Strategy to 
2012 adopted in 2006 sets the conditions, policy tools 
and timeline for implementation of the Energy Strategy.
36 in Kosovo, the strategic objectives for the development 
of energy for the 2005-2015 period include:
Within this period to posses with generation ca-•	
pacities for electricity of at least 1800 MW, to pro-
vide steady supply for Kosovo’s consummators 
and export 30-50% of generated electricity.
improvement of economy sector, through finaliza-•	
tion of KEK restructuring and reformation and in-
crease of its competitive advantages, ensuring full 
revenue collection of billed electricity by 2009.
advancement of transmission and distribution •	
network while ensuring their full integration with 
the regional and European energy network and 
reducing technical losses to the level of interna-
tional standards by 2010-2012.
increase of efficiency in ensuring needed financial •	
resources and efficient management of invest-
ments with emphasizes on creating attractive 
conditions for international investors who need to 
participate with up to 60% in financing the overall 
investments in this sector.
up to the end of 2012 regional centers of Kosovo •	
will have a district heating system and regional 
gas system
restoration of consequences in the environ-•	
ment created around power plant up to 2010 
and thorough implementation of high norms and 
standards of environmental protection during 
construction of new capacities of electricity gen-
eration aiming the fulfillment of obligation from 
KYoto protocol.
increase of awareness on benefits of rational utili-•	
zation of energy and usage of alternative energy 
resources.
Significant increase of domestic capacities for re-•	
search and development and implementation of 
advanced technology and modern management 
within institutions and public enterprises of en-
ergy.
38 the Energy Sector development Strategy to 2015, in-
cludes five priorities:
Continuous technological modernization of exist-•	
ing energy facilities/systems/sources, in oil, natu-
ral gas, coal, power sector and district heating;
Economic use of high quality energy products and •	
an increase in energy efficiency in the production, 
distribution and utilization of energy by end con-
sumers of energy services;
use of new renewable energy sources and new, •	
more energy efficient and environmentally ac-
ceptable energy technologies and installations/
equipment; 
Extraordinary/urgent investments in new electric-•	
ity sources;
Construction of new energy infrastructure facili-•	
ties and electricity generation capacity, within the 
framework of regional and pan European infra-
structure.
 
38 the Strategy has been prepared from MEM based on 
EStap i-ii (World Bank 2002-2005), KfW study (2000), 
White paper (2003), experts feedback engaged by Ear 
and riinVESt institute.
 
39 Envisioned infrastructure development includes:
Extraordinary/urgent investments in new electric-•	
ity sources;
private investment into additional lignite fired •	
thermal power plants in the obrenovac Lignite 
complex with associated investment into addi-
tional lignite extraction capacities including new 
open pits;
new interconnections to neighbouring natural •	
gas and electricity systems;
Spread of retail natural gas networks;•	
Construction of the underground gas storage in •	
Banatski dvor.
40 in Kosovo the old underground gas system still exists 
reaching all the way to Skopje (based on production of 
synthetic gas from gasification within former Elektroeko-
nomia of Kosovo). the gas system in some part has been 
seriously damaged but its overall condition has not been 
estimated yet. Based on expert evaluation within EStap 
i (World Bank), the existing line does not have a reason-
able cost of repair; therefore, it is recommended that a 
new pipe line be built with new operational parameters. 
46
the government is entitled to use the line Elez Han-Mi-
trovica and this should be taking into consideration 
when constructing a gas-main. to reach a main market in 
Kosovo-pristina, it is necessary to build a new gas-main 
100km long, although we must state that a complete 
feasibility study on this issue has not been conducted 
and thus several experts disagree on the reliability of the 
existing pipeline.
41 the strategy envisages a transitional model for the elec-
tricity market based on the design and application of well 
defined tariffs which will open the way to establishment 
of a real permanent electricity market where the parties 
can have full access. the structure and methodology of 
tariffs that cover the costs will have a big impact on ef-
ficient functioning of the market. the specificities for the 
design of the tariffs will have to be defined by the Ero, 
based on the information and recommendations from 
the participating parties in the market. a well composed 
tariff structure is absolutely necessary for the successful 
operation of initial phase of MttEE and further transition 
to an energy market.
42 under the CardS programs, support was directed to 
technical assistance to the Serbian regulatory agency, 
the Energy Market operator and regulatory reforms, as 
well as to the improvement in electricity transmission 
lines and district heating.  including support to the re-
construction of the energy production and transmission 
capacities, from Eur 1.2 billion of the Eu CardS 2000 – 
2006 assistance for Serbia, Eur 225 million was directed 
to the energy sector.
43 Eu support for assisting Kosovo to meet the standards 
of the Sap amounted by June 2006 to over €1 billion. 
Within the energy sector, Eu assistance is multi-sectoral. 
this can be illustrated by a brief overview of this year 
projects. in May, the agency launched a project to up-
grade the electricity transmission network in Kosovo and 
handed over mobile equipment to KoStt. the security 
and reliability of KoStt is crucial for the functioning of 
the internal and regional electricity market. at the same 
time the agency is assisting MEM to implement its policy 
and strategy for development of the energy sector and 
to meet the requirements of the regional Energy Com-
munity treaty. this assistance also covers the preparation 
of an energy efficiency program, development of a social 
plan for the restructuring process of the energy sector, 
advancing compliance with the acquis on environment 
and promoting investments in the energy sector. the 
agency is also continuing to support the development 
of new generation capacities and related transmission 
with ongoing studies. these studies cover market analy-
sis, transmission system impact assessment, new power 
plant sizing and technical analysis and site selection 
including economic and financial analysis with a work 
plan for development of the new power plant. also the 
agency is undertaking a study to assess water sources 
and supply for the planned new power plant (Kosovo C).
44  the EC Energy Community Ministerial Council decided 
to draw up a list of priority energy infrastructure projects 
using the criteria established in the Eu trans-European 
networks for Energy program in order to support a re-
gional energy network.
45 the major potential benefits of privatization of KEK 
would be reduced state control of the power sector, the 
efficiencies in investment and operations that can ac-
company private ownership, and the funds that would 
come from the sale of KEK to private owners.
46 First professional associations of engineers were set 
in Serbia in mid 19th century. these organizations were 
active and growing almost continuously during political 
turmoil and wars. after World War ii organizations not 
only renewed activities in different political circum-
stances, but also became important players in policy for-
mulation and execution, technical education, technical 
standardization and dissemination of best practice. the 
relative openness of Yugoslavia towards modern energy 
and transport technologies and their actual application 
were, in many cases initiated through these organiza-
tions. 
47 For the last two years, KFoS has developed a project of 
“development of Capacities of administration” through 
which it is fighting the constant challenge of keeping 
high qualified government administration staff in the 
government. the dominant factor in this challenge re-
mains the government salary system, which in the cur-
rent state, cannot offer competitive salaries that would 
conform to the professional and academic qualifications 
of its employees. as such the nature of this low paid sal-
ary system discourages young Western-educated expert 
to apply for leading position in the government. at the 
same time the number of obligations towards the inter-
national community is increasing and in particular the 
demands of the European integration process and the 
need for new human resources that would enable the ad-
ministration to fulfill its obligations in a professional and 
timely manner. this program has played a crucial role in 
encouraging of experts with the required background to 
engage in the Kosovar agency for European integration, 
various departments of ministries responsible for Eu in-
tegration as well as other departments.
47
48 the cost of environmental impacts in Serbia was esti-
mated between 5.11 percent and 14.85 percent of the 
Gdp in 2003. this summarized economic costs of Co2 
emissions (45.6 million tons a year), So2 emissions and 
net import (525,000 tons), nox emissions and net im-
port (161,000 tons), nH3 emissions (90,000 tons), VoC 
emissions (97,000 tons), emissions of small particulates 
(60,000 tons) and lead (pb) contamination (351 tons). 
Most of the Co2, So2, nox, small particulates and pb 
emissions were related to the energy sector while the 
economic cost of the So2 emissions created more than 
half of the resulting economic damage. taken from as-
sessment of the Economic Value of Environmental deg-
radation in Serbia, prepared for the European agency 
for reconstruction and published September 2004, and 
cited here according to “Economic activity and State of 
the Environment in Serbia”, prof. dr. radmilo pesic, Back-
ground document for the Serbia Strategy for Sustainable 
development, Government of Serbia, Sustainable devel-
opment project.
49  Kosovo B has average particle emission of 260 mg/nm3 
which is far lower than Kosovo a. due to the fact that 
units a1, a3, a4 and a5 of tpp Kosovo a are scheduled 
for retirement by 2010, only units B1 and B2 are under 
consideration for refurbishment.
50  this includes water from open cast mines, poor con-
ditions in the phenol reservoirs and basins, washout of 
phenol from rain, and concentrated phenols in emis-
sions.
51 its per capita carbon intensity was higher than the 
world average and below the oECd average while the 
carbon intensity of Gdp (at 5.05 kg Co2/ uS$ 2,000) was 
several times over both the world average (0.76 kg Co2/ 
uS$ 2,000) and the oECd average (0.47 kg Co2/ uS$ 2,000 
which again demonstrates low efficiency of energy use in 
the country. taken from assessment of the Economic Val-
ue of Environmental degradation in Serbia, prepared for 
the European agency for reconstruction and published 
September 2004, and cited here according to “Economic 
activity and State of the Environment in Serbia”, prof. 
dr. radmilo pesic, Background document for the Serbia 
Strategy for Sustainable development, Government of 
Serbia, Sustainable development project.
 
52 the regional Environmental Center for Central and 
Eastern Europe (rEC): Environmental Snapshot of South 
Eastern Europe, rEreep, regional Environmental recon-
struction programme, Country profiles, March 2006.
 
53 in order to protect energy resources (according to 
the Law for Spatial planning no.2003/14, article 3), the 
Kosovo Ministry of Energy and Mining has proposed to 
the parliament of Kosovo to proclaim them as zones of 
special interest, and as such they would be protected 
from uncontrolled activities not conforming to the spa-
tial plan. 
 
54  the number of registered vehicles in 2005 was around 
1.9 million (up from some 1.5 million in 2000). the age of 
vehicles causes concern both regarding traffic safety and 
environmental risks. in 2004 and 2005, 40.1 percent and 
36.2 percent, respectively, of vehicles were more than 15 
years old. Merely 6.8 percent and 11.5 percent, respec-
tively, were less than three years old. data on the vehicle 
stock by category of certificate (excluding passenger 
cars) showed that 84.5 percent of the vehicles had no 
environmental certificate in 2004, and 77.5 percent had 
none in 2005. Serbia Environmental agency, 2007
 
55 the treaty also implied both ratifying and applying 
the Energy Charter treaty and the Extractive industries 
transparency initiative (Eiti), both discussed in greater 
detail in the first policy brief.
 
56 the treaty includes the following specific components 
of the acquis communautaire on energy:
EC directive no. 2003/54 concerns common rules 1. 
for the internal market in electricity; 
EC directive no 2003/55 concerns common rules 2. 
for the internal market in natural gas; 
EC regulation no 2003/1228/ on conditions for 3. 
access to the network for cross-border exchange 
in electricity. 
57 the treaty includes the following specific components 
of the acquis communautaire on environment:
EC directive no 1985/337/EEC on the assessment 1. 
of the effects of certain public and private proj-
ects on the environment, and as amended by EC 
directive no 1997/11 and EC directive no 2003/35 
from 26 May 2003 from 1 July 2006; 
EC directive no 1999/32 relating to a reduction in 2. 
the sulfur content of certain liquid fuels from de-
cember 31, 2011; 
EC directive no 2001/80 on the limitation of emis-3. 
sions of certain pollutants into the air from large 
combustion plants from december 31, 2017; 
article 4(2) of EC directive no 1979/409/EEC on 4. 
the conservation of wild birds from July 1, 2006.
58  the thessaloniki agenda was detailed in Council deci-
48
sion 2004/520/EC of June 14, 2004 and followed by the 
Council decision 2006/56/EC of January 30, 2006.
 
59 Kosovo, due to its undefined political status (at the 
time of this writing), is not a signatory of any protocol 
or memorandum at the un level for reduction of green-
house gases, but as a signatory to the EC treaty, should 
“endeavour” to establish targets and frameworks for 
significant long-term reduction of greenhouse gases in 
keeping with the goal of the Kyoto Convention. 
 
60 For Serbia this has meant adhering as well to ear-
lier commitments amongst. Serbia is a party to CLrtap 
(1979) and its protocol on Long-term financing of the Co-
operative programme for Monitoring and Evaluation of 
the Long-range transmissions of air pollutants in Europe 
(1984). However, it has not ratified the following seven 
CLrtap protocols:
protocol on the reduction of Sulfur Emissions of 1. 
their trans-boundary Fluxes by at least 30 per cent 
(1985);
protocol concerning the Control of Emissions of 2. 
nitrogen oxides or their trans-boundary Fluxes 
(1988);
protocol concerning the Control of Emissions of 3. 
Volatile organic Compounds or their trans-bound-
ary Fluxes (1988);
protocol on Further reduction of Sulfur Emissions 4. 
(1994); 
protocol on persistent organic pollutants (pops) 5. 
(1998);
protocol on Heavy Metals (1998);6. 
protocol to abate acidification, Eutrophication 7. 
and Ground-level ozone (1999).
 
61  these include the following acquis directives:
EC directive no 1985/337/EEC on the assessment 1. 
on the environment of certain public and pri-
vate projects, and it’s the directive’s subsequent 
amendment on 31 december 2004, upon the en-
try into force of the treaty;
EC directive no 1999/32 on reduction of sulfur 2. 
content of certain liquid fuels by 31st december 
2011;
EC directive no 2001/80 on large combustion 3. 
plants by 31st december 2017;
article 4(2) of the EC directive no 1979/409/EEC 4. 
on the conservation of wild birds upon the entry 
into force of the treaty. 
 
62 Following adoption of the Law on the activities of Wa-
ter, Waste Water and Waste Services providers, the Water 
and Waste Water regulatory office issued secondary leg-
islation in 2005 for the implementation of this law. 
 
63 the plan involves 16 environmental sectors under sepa-
rate discussion. a study of the Final plan reveals 23 objec-
tives to be met, 48 measures to be taken and 163 activi-
ties to be completed in the 5-year period. Each activity 
has been defined by the level of treatment, including the 
key actors, potential financial resources, interconnection 
of the given activity with activities in other sectors, and, 
finally, the clear indicators of the level of the plan’s imple-
mentation to be considered during the assessment in 5 
years. the greatest number of activities planned for the 
next five years are in the sectors of Biodiversity and For-
est Management (14 per sector), followed by the sectors 
of Energy, Mining and industry (13), Waste Management 
(11), and those of air, public Health and agriculture.
 
64 according to tMEM officials, the following list provides 
an overview of progress against specific measures in 
Kosovo: 
Kosovo is already implementing EC directive no •	
1985/337/EEC and came into force upon signing; 
the Ministry of Environment and Spatial planning 
(MESp) supervises the implementation;
action plan has already been prepared for the im-•	
plementation of the “Sulfur directive,” EC directive 
no 1999/32 to be implemented by 31 december 
2011; 
action plan has already been prepared for the •	
implementation of the “LCp directive,” EC direc-
tive 2001/80 to be implemented by 31 december 
2017; 
implementation is already underway for article •	
4(2) of EC directive 1979/409/EEC on the conser-
vation of wild birds, and came into force upon 
signing; the MESp supervises the implementa-
tion.
  
65 rEC Bulletin, published by the field office in Kosova/o, 
number 20, Summer 2006.
66 For more details on energy and population Serbia see 
the undp publication “Stuck in the past – Energy, Envi-
ronment and poverty in Serbia and Montenegro” (undp, 
2004) available for download at http://www.undp.org/
energy/stuckpast.htm
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